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Abstract 
 
The signing of a free trade agreement was a watershed moment in New 
Zealand-China relations and provided a number of advantages for New 
Zealand firms seeking to expand their presence in the Chinese market. 
However, it is well established that many businesses in China use informal 
relationships (guanxi) to create business opportunities and facilitate their way 
through bureaucratic obstacles. Doubts have also been raised in the past 
about local governments’ implementing China’s international agreements and 
about the current efficacy and reliability of China’s legal institutions.  
 
This thesis examines the informal relationships New Zealand SMEs based in 
China maintain with local officials and street-level bureaucrats and how they 
experienced the implementation of the FTA. Interviews with New Zealand 
businesspeople in Shanghai and Xiamen reveal that SMEs were encountering 
problems getting their goods across the border at the lower tariff rates 
provided in the FTA. They were very positive about the FTA, however, as the 
profile of New Zealand officials and firms had risen considerably. It is 
established that New Zealand firms are engaging in collaborative activities 
with New Zealand government representatives in an attempt to gain further 
competitive advantage and that the practice of guanxi is adapting in response 
to Beijing’s attempts to formalise officials’ interactions with private sector 
firms. It is suggested that a firm’s reputation (mingyu) with officials may be 
becoming established as an alternative to guanxi. 
 
KEY WORDS: New Zealand, China, Free Trade Agreement, Guanxi, Local 
Government, Informal Relationships 
 
 
 
 3 
Contents 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7 
1. Introduction 9 
 PART I  
2. FORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND 
CHINA: THE FTA, EXPECTATIONS OF ITS BENEFITS AND ITS 
EFFECTS 
15 
2.1 Overview of the FTA 16 
2.2 Key Outcomes of the FTA for New Zealand 18 
2.3 Expectations of Trade Agreements 20 
2.4 Public Statements 22 
2.5 Examination of Trade Figures 23 
2.6 Summary of Part I 31 
 PART II  
3. THE MINGLING OF THE FORMAL AND THE INFORMAL:  
THE LAW, THE STATE AND GUANXI IN CHINA 
33 
3.1 The Administration of Law in China 35 
3.2 The Decentralised Structure of the People’s Republic of China 40 
3.2.1 The Consequences of Decentralisation on Economic Decision-
Making in China 
41 
3.2.2 The Effects of Decentralisation on Foreign Companies at Street-
Level 
50 
3.3 Guanxi and its Future in a Changing Society  53 
3.3.1 Academic Study of Guanxi 58 
3.3.2 How Guanxi Affects Businesses in Today’s China  61 
3.4 The Link Between Guanxi and Corruption 66 
3.5 Summary of Part II 70 
  
 
 
 
 4 
 PART III  
4. FORMAL RULES AND INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS: HOW 
NEW ZEALAND SMES EXPERIENCED THE NZCFTA 
74 
4.1 Methodology 74 
4.2 Problems at the Border 81 
4.3 Interactions Between New Zealand SMEs and Street-Level 
Bureaucrats 
89 
4.4 Benefits at the local level 100 
4.5 The strength of relationships between the governments of New 
Zealand and China 
118 
5. CONCLUSIONS 124 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 131 
 APPENDIX 146 
 Appendix 1: HS Codes and products for all products exported to New Zealand 
in 2009 valued more than NZ$ 10M 
146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Phase-Out Periods for Tariffs on Sensitive Products Exported 
from New Zealand to China 
19 
Table 2: Growth in NZ Exports to China Compared with China’s 
GDP Growth and China’s Total Imports 
26 
Table 3: Composition of Subjects Interviewed 77 
  
Figure 1: Comparison of NZ Exports to China and Value of the NZ 
Dollar 
28 
Figure 2: Variation in Growth Rates Based on Degree of FTA Tariff 
Change 
29 
 
 
 
 6 
Abbreviations 
APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  
ASEAN – Association of South-East Asian Nations 
CER – Closer Economic Relations 
CIQ  - Customs, Inspections and Quarantine 
CPC Communist Party of China 
EU – European Union 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA – Free Trade Agreement 
HS Code – Harmonized System Code 
KEA- Kiwi Expats Abroad 
MFAT – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (New Zealand) 
MFN - Most-Favoured Nation 
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement 
NZCFTA  - New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement 
NZCTA  - New Zealand China Trade Association 
NZD – New Zealand Dollar 
NZTE – New Zealand Trade and Enterprise 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PTA – Preferential Trading Arrangement 
PRC – People’s Republic of China 
RMB – RenMinBi (Currency of China, also known as the Yuan) 
ROO - Rules of Origin 
RTA – Regional Trading Agreement 
SEZ – Special Economic Zone 
SME – Small and Medium Enterprise 
SOE – State Owned Enterprise 
TVE - Township and Village Enterprise 
UN – United Nations 
VAT – Value Added Tax 
WTO – World Trade Organization
 7 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
This project did not take place sitting in a library or at a computer desk 
reading the work of other people. In fact, few of the ideas presented here I can 
claim genuinely as my own. Rather they are combined thoughts of the many 
people I talked to over the course of the year I spent working on it. To these 
people I owe a debt of gratitude.  
 
Firstly to my supervisors – Ben for encouraging me to explore my ideas and 
follow my instincts and spending time with me to work through the ones that 
vexed me, and Xiaoming for keeping me in line, forcing academic precision 
on me when it was needed, and for introducing me to his many contacts in 
New Zealand and China without whom this project wouldn’t have 
progressed as far as it has.  
 
Throughout my field research in Shanghai and Xiamen I met many New 
Zealanders and Chinese people who gave me their frank assessments of the 
current state of affairs. I was truly surprised at their openness and the 
enthusiasm for helping me - a stranger except for a few imploring emails. 
Despite the busy nature of their lives in China, each and every one of them 
was welcoming and generous with their time and ideas. Thank you for telling 
me what you know, and also for being honest in what you didn’t know; an 
often undervalued component of understanding China in my opinion. 
Without all of you this project would not have been possible.  
 
My thanks also to the many officials I spoke with at MFAT, NZTE, NZ 
Customs and MAF. The positive relations between New Zealand and China 
reflect, I think, that despite the differences between the cultures of our two 
countries, New Zealand is well-served by the officials who drove the FTA 
through to its completion and continue to develop the ever-strengthening 
relationship between the two governments. My thanks in particular go to 
 8 
Sally Page at MFAT for tolerating my many calls and emails, and to Julie 
Haack for her advice on pathways and people to be considered. The same also 
goes to sector representatives from forestry, seafood, horticulture and Maori 
enterprises who gave me an insight into events in their areas and their work 
in China.  
 
Thanks also to my officemate and friend Yang. You tolerated my incessant 
questions about China, and always spoke well in our lively discussions on the 
nature of China and its future. If you are anything to judge the next 
generation of China on, the future is bright.  
 
Thanks to my friends and family, my parents and Rachel, Simon and Kezia in 
particular. You are all dear to my heart.  
 9 
 
Introduction 
 
A little over a year after the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement 
(NZCFTA) was signed Prime Minister John Key praised the agreement, 
noting that New Zealand’s export earnings had increased 61 percent, or 1.3 
billion from the year before.1 The established literature on business behaviour 
in China documents that, while formal procedures are becoming more 
established, informal relationships still play an important part in how 
business is conducted (Yang, 1994; Guthrie, 1998; Wang, 2000; Wank, 2002; 
Luo, 2007; Krug, 2009). Although the Chinese economy has undergone a 
period of drastic reform and been opened to market forces, central and local 
government are highly involved in economic decision-making to an extent 
that is much greater than in developed western economies (Oi, 1992; Nee, 
1992; Shirk, 1993; Boisot and Child, 2006; Thun, 2006; Huang, 2008). As New 
Zealand companies seek to increase their presence in China, in line with the 
Key Government’s objective of doubling New Zealand’s trade with China 
within five years,2 it is timely that we gain a greater understanding of the 
issues facing New Zealand firms in China.  
 
This project seeks to begin such an undertaking within an academic context, 
examining the informal relationships that New Zealand small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) based in China maintain with local officials and street-
level bureaucrats. The FTA provides the context for this study. The 
agreement, after all, marks a highpoint in relations between the two 
governments. Indeed, New Zealand now appears to occupy a privileged 
position amongst western countries in its dealings with China. But what 
discernable effects has the FTA had upon New Zealand businesses operating 
in China? Usually this question would be answered by looking to export 
figures or foreign direct investment numbers. I argue that upon examination 
                                                
1 John Key “Speech to Federated Farmers National Council“ 18 November 2009. 
2 “Key aims to double trade with China”, New Zealand Herald, 7 July 2010.  
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these figures do not present a clear picture. Moreover, China’s culture, 
political system and legal system operate differently from New Zealand’s 
traditional trading partners and therefore require additional examination.   
 
Commonly translated as informal relationships or connections, guanxi (关系) 
is known to be important for success within China (Bjorkman and Kock, 1995; 
Wank, 1995; Yeung and Tung, 1996; Pearce and Robinson, 2000; Wang, 2000; 
Hutchings and Murray, 2002; Yang, 2002; Langenburg, 2007; Luo, 2007). Like 
much in China, however, guanxi’s position and efficacy is changing as the 
country’s rapid economic development has fomented change across its 
society.  
 
Since the reform programme began in China, local government has played an 
active role in guiding local economic development. Developing good guanxi 
has been promoted as a means for foreign firms to cope with the street-level 
bureaucrats, who can wield large amounts of discretionary power and the 
vague legal environment. Connections with local officials can also gain firms 
advantages and connections that will help their business while avoiding some 
obstacles. Seeking to reduce corrupt cadre behaviour, however, Beijing has 
sought to limit the discretionary powers of low-level officials and establish 
stronger legal institutions and behaviour.  
 
The NZCFTA established a number of benefits to enable New Zealand 
products to enter China more freely. Chief among the benefits touted by then 
Prime Minister Helen Clark and Trade Minister Phil Goff were tariff 
reductions and improved customs procedures (Clark, 2008; Goff, 2008). This 
study finds that the benefits of tariff reductions are more ambiguous than 
traditionally thought. Indeed, following the implementation of the FTA, SMEs 
were struggling to realise tariff benefits and were frustrated that the process 
for getting their goods into China had become more complicated. In contrast, 
however, they were very positive about the effects that the NZCFTA has had 
on the relationship between New Zealand and China, and were using the 
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higher profile and increased status of New Zealand to develop more 
opportunities for their firms.  
 
The impact that formal agreements, such as preferential trading agreements, 
can have on informal relationships has not been closely examined within the 
literature; neither was it given as a motive for New Zealand to consider the 
FTA with China. Rather, most focus has been applied to tariff levies and the 
increases in trade that can be expected when they are alleviated. Moreover, 
comprehensive trading agreements have up until recently usually existed 
between states with geographic or cultural similarities, providing them with a 
shared history upon which their relationship is already firmly established.  
 
New Zealand and China’s FTA represents a change to this standard. New 
Zealand’s formal, legal tradition stands in contrast to the informal channels of 
interpersonal relationships that businesses in China have relied upon in the 
past. Observers of business in China commonly highlight the gap between the 
formal legal rules upon which business activity in China is supposed to take 
place, and the reality of how it is actually undertaken. To suppose 
implementation of the terms of the FTA as agreed is an assumption that 
requires verification, as informal relationships in China are often as important 
as formal rules and regulations.  
 
Rather than seeking to evaluate the success of the FTA solely on economic 
terms, this thesis seeks to also examine the effect the FTA has had below the 
central government level by looking at interactions at the grassroots level 
which standard statistical measures cannot provide insight on. This thesis, 
then, will look at the experiences of businesspeople and how the FTA has 
affected their activities.  
 
There is a considerable gap in the literature in terms of the experiences of 
New Zealand businesses in China. Given the importance that China now 
holds as a trading partner for New Zealand, surprisingly little study has been 
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conducted on the relationship or the experience of New Zealand companies 
operating in China. Only one article has been published on the experience of 
New Zealand businesses in China and this was published in the mid-nineties, 
so is now quite out of date. The article, by Alan Au and Peter Enderwick 
(1994), examined the experiences of 13 small New Zealand companies that 
were operating joint ventures in China in the late eighties and early nineties.3 
Most of the companies reported a high level of dissatisfaction and frustration 
with their Chinese partners, while the follow up survey found a high casualty 
rate with most of the firms failing or terminating their joint venture.  
 
Outside of academia more studies have been undertaken, but most of these 
have been either written or commissioned by New Zealand government 
ministries or agencies such as the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFAT), New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) or the Asia New 
Zealand Foundation. These are, for the most part, focused on the FTA or the 
opportunities and challenges available for New Zealand business in China as 
opposed to actual company performance. Many of these works are discussed 
in this thesis.4  
 
This thesis is broken into three parts. Part I first looks at the relationship that 
exists between China and New Zealand and provides an overview of the 
                                                
3 Four other articles can also be found on New Zealand businesses involvement within the 
Chinese market. The first deals mainly with skills and knowledge businesspeople were 
thought to be most important for doing business in China and the second with marketing 
strategies. Two other published works also deal with the subject of guanxi. See Brett Martin 
and Gretchen Larsen “Taming the tiger: key success factors for trade with China“ Marketing 
Intelligence & Planning 17(4) 1999: 202 – 208; Henry F.L. Chung “International 
Standardization Strategies: The Experiences of Australian and New Zealand Firms Operating 
in the Greater China Markets“ Journal of International Marketing 11(3) 2003: 48-82; Yunxi 
Zhu “Managing Business Relationships in New Zealand and China” Management 
International Review 49(2) 2009: 225-248; Hongzhi Gao “Guanxi Dilemmas and Gatekeepers: 
A Qualitative Study of Chinese-Western Relationships in Marketing” PhD Thesis, University 
of Otago, February 2009.  
4 “Joint Study Report on the Free Trade Agreement between China and New Zealand“ by The 
Ministry of Commerce, China and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand; 
“New Zealand – China Free Trade Agreement (and Associated Instruments) National Interest 
Analysis“; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand), 2008. Rolf D. Cremer and 
Bala Ramasamy “Effective Strategies for New Zealand Firms in China“ Asia New Zealand 
Foundation, 2005.  
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FTA. The motivations for the New Zealand Government, as stated in reports 
on the FTA, public statements by politicians and papers presented to Cabinet 
are also examined. These motivations will then be measured against the 
achievements observable in New Zealand’s trade figures with China. By 
looking back over the previous decade’s trade figures I establish that 
although exports to China did increase in the immediate period following the 
signing of the FTA, the extent to which tariff reductions contributed towards 
this increase is unclear.  
 
In Part II I seek to establish contributing factors that can add to our 
understanding for why the increase in trade activity may have taken place 
that cannot be explained through economic models. In order to achieve this I 
turn to the academic literature on China’s reform programme and its 
economic development. Extensive academic study over the last few decades 
has sought to explain how China’s economy has grown so rapidly despite the 
absence of strong institutions or a clear delineation of responsibilities between 
businesses and the state. China is not unique in that developing economies 
often struggle, to varying degrees of success, to implement laws that are seen 
to be imported (Corne, 1997; Pistor, 2000; Gong, 2004; Clark, Murrell and 
Whiting, 2008), but its local governments have a record of independent 
behaviour which promotes local interests rather than those of the central 
government and have been active in promoting local economic development 
(Huang, 1990; Oi, 1992; Wank, 1995; Boisot and Child, 1996; Krug, 2000; Segal 
and Thun, 2001; Kong, 2005, 74-76; Goodman, 2009, 446) as have street-level 
bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980; Bruun, 1995; Chow, 2005). Combined with the 
importance of informal relationships in China’s developing economy (Yang, 
1994; Guthrie, 1997; Wang, 2000; Wank, 2002; Lagenburg, 2007; Luo, 2007), 
that something is occurring that falls outside of official figures is not overly 
surprising.  
 
In the next section, I present the methodology used to conduct interviews 
with New Zealand businesspeople in Shanghai and Xiamen. The information 
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gathered in interviews is then presented in Part III. These interviews reveal 
benefits that extend upon standard perspectives of the advantages of 
preferential trading agreements. While China’s current legal and political 
systems present challenges to the implementation of a formal trading 
agreement, New Zealand businesspeople and government representatives are 
making extensive use of informal relationships to expand trading 
opportunities between the two countries.   
 
The concluding chapter summarises the findings of the thesis and offers 
suggestions for future areas of study.  
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PART ONE 
Formal Relations Between New Zealand and China: The 
FTA, Expectations of its Benefits and its Effects 
 
Over the last two decades New Zealand’s trade with China has grown 
rapidly, to the extent that it is now New Zealand’s second most important 
trading partner.  China’s rapid economic growth has enriched millions of 
Chinese whose spending power has expanded such that demand for many of 
the products that New Zealand produces has risen considerably. The growth 
has been most evident in New Zealand’s primary goods exports, with dairy 
products, wood, wool, seafood, and meat, comprising the majority of goods 
exported to China (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, 2010: 4-5).  
 
As New Zealand’s economy is focused on primary products and services and 
China’s on manufactured goods, there is a high degree of compatibility 
between the two countries’ economies, far greater than that between New 
Zealand and its traditional trading partners of Australia, the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  
 
Despite these natural advantages, China presents considerable challenges to 
New Zealand’s exporters. Obviously the size difference – a population of 1.4 
billion compared to 4 million - is a major factor for New Zealand’s small and 
medium-sized businesses. But there are also large cultural and language 
barriers, and differences in the legal and political institutions that each 
country employs. As individuals and as businesses, New Zealanders have 
relatively little experience in operating in cultural and political environments 
different from their own. David Mahon, Managing Director of one of the 
oldest New Zealand-owned businesses in China, wrote:  
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“Many New Zealanders believe in the myth that the country already has 
a broad global footprint. Of a population of just over four million people, 
according to New Zealand Treasury statistics, a further 460,000 New 
Zealanders live in other countries. The majority of these expatriates, over  
350,000, live in Australia. The next significant block, some 60,000, live 
in the United Kingdom, and there are a few pockets in the United States. 
All are safe, English-speaking alternatives to living in New Zealand…  
The idea that New Zealanders are largely an adventurous, experimental  
people who will throw themselves into unfamiliar cultures and adapt is  
therefore incorrect (2009: 1-2). 
 
In this section I will briefly discuss the steps leading up to the signing of the 
FTA, its contents, and provide a short analysis of its effects. Given the 
agreement is still in its formative period, it is still too early to expect any 
assessment of the agreement to reveal a clear patterns and effects. However, 
as it is the most important event to have occurred between the New Zealand 
and China to date, to not discuss the agreement would be remiss. In contrast, 
we would also expect that the informal benefits of the FTA will be at their 
highest during in the immediate period following the agreement coming into 
effect. Furthermore, an understanding of the expectations of what was 
expected from the formal agreement, will establish what other additional 
effects have been realised beyond what was initially expected.  
  
Overview of the FTA 
 
During a three-day visit in 2003 to New Zealand by President Hu Jintao, a 
number of agreements were signed that solidified in writing the rapidly 
strengthening relationship – a Consular Agreement, an agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade and an arrangement on Mutual Recognition of 
Academic Degrees in Higher Education (Goff, 2003; Anderton, 2003; 
Maharey, 2003). Further progress was achieved in April 2004 when New 
Zealand became the first developed economy to recognise China as a market 
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economy and the two countries agreed on a formal Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Framework that paved the way for formal discussions on the 
FTA to begin (Clark, 2004; Xinhua News Agency, 2004).  
 
A Cabinet Paper presented in October 2004 details the benefits and the 
concerns that had been gathered from public submissions and consultations 
with New Zealand businesses on the prospect of an FTA with China.5 They 
included: 
 
- Strong support for an FTA. 
- Removal of tariffs was seen as a significant benefit to many business 
and consumers. 
- Concern about tariff reductions expressed by unions and some sectors 
of the economy protected by tariffs. 
- A strong message from businesses that the FTA should be about more 
than just tariffs and should include discussions on non-tariff barriers 
such as standards, labelling and quarantine issues.  
- Concerns about restrictions in the service sector in China.  
- Concerns over Intellectual Property. 
- Issues about the movement of foreign exchange and capital 
requirements.  
- Labour and environmental issues in China.  
 
New Zealand and China entered negotiations in December 20046 following a 
Joint Study released in June outlining the potential for both sides to benefit 
from an agreement. The report found that despite the economies’ vastly 
different sizes, there were sufficient reasons to begin negotiations for an FTA 
due to the complimentary nature of their economies. Assistant Minister of 
Commerce Yi Xiaozhun led the Chinese side of the initial negotiations; his 
                                                
5 Cabinet Paper dated October 2004, “Free Trade Agreement with China: Release of 
Feasibility Study and Launch of Negotiations”; obtained under the Official Information Act.  
6 “Nation, New Zealand to launch FTA talks” China Daily 22 November 2004; “Free trade 
talks with New Zealand start” China Daily 7 December 2004.  
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counterpart was New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade China 
Taskforce Director Charles Finny. Rapid progress ensued and two years later 
the decision was made to accelerate talks.7 By early 2008 negotiations were 
nearing their end and on 7 April 2008 New Zealand Prime Minister Helen 
Clark led a delegation to Beijing for the signing of the agreement with Wen 
Jiabao in the Great Hall of the People.  
 
Key Outcomes of the FTA 
 
The agreement that was agreed to was a comprehensive FTA liberalising 
trade in goods and services and investment rules. The key outcomes as 
described on the New Zealand Government’s China FTA website covering 
the agreement are: 
 
- Liberalised trade in goods 
- Rules developed to govern trade 
- Liberalised trade in services 
- An agreement on movement of people 
- Processes for facilitating investment 
- Conformity assessment of electrical and electronic equipment 
- Development of a dispute settlement process 
Additional to the FTA, an Environmental Cooperation Agreement and a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation were also signed.  
 
The most sought after gains from FTAs are the reductions on tariffs. Of New 
Zealand’s total exports to China before the FTA came into force, 96% will be 
eliminated by the end of the phase-in process that ends at the end of 2018. All 
goods that were subject to less than 5% tariff beforehand were eliminated, 
while duties from 6-20% will be phased out over five years. Tariffs greater 
than 20% were reduced to 20%. Certain ‘sensitive’ products reflecting 
                                                
7 “China, New Zealand agree to accelerate FTA talks” Xinhua News Agency 14 November 
2006.  
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exporting strengths of New Zealand, however, were subject to slower 
reductions. These products and the length of time before tariffs would be 
eliminated are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: PHASE-OUT PERIODS FOR TARIFFS ON SENSITIVE 
PRODUCTS EXPORTED FROM NEW ZEALAND TO CHINA 
Product Phase-out period for tariffs 
Dairy: butter, cheese and liquid milk  10 years 
Dairy: milk powders 12 years 
Meat: Sheep, beef and edible offal  9 years 
Most seafood products 5 years 
Apples 5 years 
Kiwifruit 9 years 
Wool Duty free treatment for 25,000 tonnes, 
raising 5% annually until 2017, under 
a country-specific quota.  
Source: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
 
To qualify for preferential tariffs, a Rules of Origin (ROO) system was 
established for New Zealand goods exporters. This required that authorised 
bodies, such as chambers of commerce, confirm that exported products were 
substantially produced in New Zealand by issuing a certificate of origin. 
Advanced rulings on origin and tariff clarification could also be requested so 
that a certificate of origin would not be required. However, these could only 
be issues by Chinese customs (CIQ) which requires that the company making 
the request has an established presence in China – so companies lacking a 
representative in China could not receive this benefit. A commitment was also 
made by China to make all reasonable efforts to release goods from customs 
within 48 hours.  
 
In the areas of environmental services, construction, agriculture and forestry, 
engineering, integrated engineering, computer and related services, and 
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tourism, New Zealand also received Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) status 
within China, meaning that any more generous benefits extended to another 
OECD country would automatically be extended to New Zealand as well. 
Guarantees of market access and national treatment were also given in certain 
sectors as well, meaning that New Zealand service firms can operate in China 
on the same basis as domestic suppliers.8  
 
Commitments were also undertaken by both sides to streamline procedures 
relating to sanitary/photosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade, 
such as electrical standards, so that it was easier to demonstrate that a 
product met established compliance standards.  
 
Expectations of Trade Agreements 
 
Economic expectations were stated quite explicitly stated by China and New 
Zealand in the Joint Study into the FTA that was undertaken prior to the start 
of formal negotiations, so establishing the expectations of New Zealand’s 
politicians and policymakers is easily achieved. However, as the Joint Study 
was concerned only with economic matters, broadening the scope to strategic 
and political concerns requires some supposition as to the objectives of the 
Clark Government.9  
 
The economic modelling in the Joint Study forecast that the benefits of an FTA 
would fall substantially in New Zealand’s favour. In the first year a 39 percent 
increase in New Zealand exports to China was predicted. China’s exports 
                                                
8 This did not extend to government procurement contracts as China was still negotiating its 
accession to the relevant section of the WTO. In the interim period China is obliged to extend 
MFN status to New Zealand firms.  
9 For this study I approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for Cabinet Papers 
regarding the FTA in the hope of gaining an insight into the issues being discussed by 
Cabinet and officials. Following discussions regarding the likelihood of relevant information 
being released and the expense that would be incurred, only one paper was requested from 
MFAT (“Free Trade Agreement with China: Release of Feasibility Study and Launch of 
Negotiations”). Some information was withheld from release on the grounds of sections 6 (a), 
9 (2) d) and 9 (2) g (ii) of the Official Information Act. The release of further papers was 
discussed, but I was advised that they would be likely to receive equal, if not more, scrutiny.  
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would in comparison grow by ten percent - substantial, but somewhat smaller 
owing to the openness of the New Zealand economy and already low tariffs 
on most imports.10  
 
The expansion of trade obtained through reduced tariffs was not the only 
gain that was expected. The complementary nature of China and New 
Zealand’s economies means that increased efficiencies and consumption 
would be likely to take place over time that would contribute to long-term 
gains from a comprehensive agreement. Significant gains in real GDP (0.25), 
real consumption (0.55) and total output level (0.25) would be achieved over 
the following decade by New Zealand. China meanwhile could expect 
respective gains of 0.07, 0.17 and 0.007 (Joint Study, 2005: 7-8).  
 
These findings are in line with other academic and institutional reports that 
argue the case for trade liberalisation. While the debate over the short-term 
costs of trade liberalisation is yet to be resolved, there is firm support for the 
economic benefits that trade liberalisation brings in the long-term.11 The Asian 
Development Outlook 2002 in its survey of the impact of Preferential Trading 
Arrangements (PTAs),12 for example, finds “near unanimity that increased 
trade openness has had a significant long-term positive impact on economic 
development” (Asia Development Bank, 2002: 159).  
 
                                                
10 In the Joint Study for example, static gains over the initial 10 years of the FTA were 
expected to bring about gains of 0.15% and 0.35% in real GDP and real consumption for New 
Zealand. The Joint Study adds a further 0.1% and 0.2% to the expected benefits of the FTA for 
New Zealand over the initial 10 year period.  
11 For economic modelling analysis see G. Grossman and E. Helpman, “Innovation and 
Growth in the World Economy” MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 1991; L. Rivera-Batiz and P. 
Romer "International Integration and Endogenous Growth" Quarterly Journal of Economics 
106 1991: 531-555. 
12 Much of the literature discussing trade liberalisation does not explicitly cover FTAs as they 
are a more recent feature of global trade. As such some the work referred to in this section 
was written in reference to Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs) or Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) which were more widely discussed during the nineties when they were 
the preferred method for states looking to liberalise their trade relationships, e.g. NAFTA, the 
EU and APEC. However, as they are very similar to FTAs, this does not cause any 
inconsistencies.  
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Traditionally when economists examined gains from trading agreements, 
they looked to the expected benefits from the removal of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers. These are known as static gains. More recently economists have 
asked why economies that are more open to international trade continue to 
make economic gains when static gains have already been fully achieved. The 
current consensus in the literature is that the answer lies in greater 
competition and more efficient allocation of resources, known as dynamic 
gains, but these are thought to be substantial only in the longer term. In terms 
of benefits gained from the FTA, China was predicted to achieve much from 
dynamic gains in the long term, whereas New Zealand was to gain 
substantially more from static gains in the period immediately following 
implementation. However, for both countries most of the gains predicted in 
the Joint Study “would be achieved through the removal of tariffs and 
unnecessary non-tariff measures” (Joint Study Report, 2005: 8).  
 
A final possible benefit is raised in the Joint Study that the authors warn is 
difficult to mathematically quantify but should not be underestimated. The 
FTA, they predicate, will increase “investor confidence and interest” because 
the agreement will signal to the private sector the improving state of New 
Zealand-China relations. The examples they offer to demonstrate this is 
through the decrease in risk premiums investors apply to the other economy, 
or improvements in the prospects of loan applications to fund investments in 
the other economy (Joint Study Report, 2005: 90-91). 
 
Public Statements 
 
This section’s focus on economic benefits also reflects the arguments for the 
FTA that were most often cited by the Clark Government for why New 
Zealanders should welcome the FTA with China. Here, for example, are the 
words of Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Trade at the time the agreement was 
signed: 
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“This agreement will create advantages for New Zealand exporters and 
consequently jobs and growth in New Zealand. Without it New Zealand 
exporters would be disadvantaged against competitors whose countries 
did secure free trade with China” (2008).  
 
Likewise, Helen Clark’s statement marking the agreement focused almost 
exclusively on the economic benefits anticipated for New Zealand: 
“Over time this FTA will result in the elimination of tariffs on 96 per 
cent of New Zealand exports to China, and is estimated to lift New 
Zealand’s export revenue from China by between US$180 to US$280 
million (NZ$225 to NZ$350 million) every year.  
The signing of this agreement is a very significant achievement for New 
Zealand. It opens up new opportunities for businesses looking to engage 
with, or grow their existing links with, China. It will facilitate goods and 
services trade, and investment. Overall, the FTA reduces barriers to our 
trade with China” (2008). 
The only acknowledgement of non-economic factors in this statement 
discussed the broader context of the relationship between the two countries: 
“[The FTA] promotes co-operation in a broad range of economic areas, 
and also provides a platform for further engagement at the governmental, 
cultural, and people-to-people levels.” (Clark, 2008). 
This statement draws our attention towards the benefits to New Zealand in 
terms of enhancing the relationship New Zealand has with China, rather than 
political objectives.  As will be discussed later, the value of relationships in 
China is one of the main differences between the cultures of New Zealand 
and China. This is especially so in business, where New Zealanders tend to 
have a business and marketing relationship approach, whereas in China 
business relationships are built from a base of guanxi and friendship (Zhu, 
2009: 243). 
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Examination of Trade Figures 
 
In the previous section the expectations of the outcomes of an FTA were 
examined. The primary economic benefits expected were anticipated to come 
from static gains resulting from the decrease in tariff rates; in other words, 
firms seeking out market opportunities that became more promising owing to 
the decrease in market-distorting tariffs. Furthermore, removal of non-tariff 
barriers and the priority given to passing New Zealand goods through 
customs should make the Chinese market more enticing to New Zealand 
exporters as red tape is reduced, market efficiencies are realised, uncertainties 
are reduced, and so forth. Having already established that the primary reason 
for New Zealand to enter into the FTA with China was for economic reasons, 
this section examines the trade figures for New Zealand exports to China in 
order to determine the extent of the FTA’s effect. 
 
Initially empirical data on New Zealand’s trade was found from information 
publicly available from New Zealand Statistics. Trade statistics were used to 
determine the pattern of exports to China based on volume. The decision to 
use volume rather than value was made primarily because of the fluctuations 
in the value of the New Zealand dollar vis-à-vis the Chinese renminbi during 
the studied period, 1999-2009. Although exports are obviously affected by 
changes in currency, by examining volume rather than value we can 
determine trends in demand for New Zealand products from China. Also, 
given the ongoing demand for the New Zealand dollar by currency traders, 
there is no reason to assume that currency fluctuations will not continue in 
the coming decade. As such, fluctuation should be considered an 
unpredictable constant that statisticians, as well as New Zealand exporters, 
will have to continue to deal with.  
 
To establish the trend that existed before the FTA commenced, the figures 
below cover the ten-year period leading up to the year anniversary of the 
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FTA.13 An increase in trade should occur when the FTA came into effect. It is 
also likely that firms should begin to explore the Chinese market more 
seriously following the commencement of negotiations for the FTA, when it 
became substantially more likely that opportunities would arise when the 
FTA came into effect. This should occur because companies recognise that in 
order to be prepared to take advantage of the new situation, they would need 
to perform large amounts of work getting to know the market, finding 
suitable partners, establishing distribution networks and taking steps to 
establish themselves as a company that can operate and sell their products in 
China.  
 
First, then, we need to establish whether or not New Zealand’s exports to 
China present any anomalies. To do this we will first examine China’s GDP 
growth over the ten-year period between 2000 and 2009. The same is also 
done for China’s total imports. By doing this we can establish whether growth 
in New Zealand’s exports correlates with the consistent growth patterns that 
the Chinese economy was experiencing, or with the growth in China’s overall 
imports of foreign products.  
 
As can been seen in Figure 1, China’s real annual growth throughout the 
noughties was consistently in the region of 10%, dipping to a low of 8% in 
2000 and reaching a high of 11.4% in 2007. Imports of goods from all foreign 
markets increased at a significantly higher rate, twice exceeding 35% and only 
decreasing once in 2009 as the world economy slowed as a result of the 
2008/2009 banking crisis. Neither of these figures however, demonstrates a 
correlation with New Zealand’s exports to China over the same time period, 
which fluctuate at different rates considerably over the decade. We do 
observe steep rises in New Zealand’s exports in three years - 2000 (44%), 2001 
(45%) and 2009 (44%) - and also significant growth in three other years - 2004 
                                                
13 During the decade this table covers, four significant events occurred that may impact upon 
the figures – 1) economic recessions in the form of the Asian crises of 1997 and the Dotcom 
Bust in 2000; 2) China’s accession to the WTO in November 2001; 3) the beginning of FTA 
talks between New Zealand and China in 2005; and 4) the signing and commencement of the 
FTA in 2008. 
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(23%), 2006 (20%) and 2008 (30%). Small growth occurs in two years - 2002 
(6%) and 2007 (4%) - while exports contracted in two years - 2003 (-4%) and 
2005 (-7%).  
 
Table 2: GROWTH IN NZ EXPORTS TO CHINA COMPARED WITH 
CHINA’S GDP GROWTH AND CHINA’S TOTAL IMPORTS 
Year 
GDP 
RMB 
billion 
at 
current 
prices 
Real 
annual 
growth 
rate 
(%) 
Imports 
(US$ 
billions) 
Percentage 
growth 
year on 
year 
NZ Exports 
to China 
(NZ$) 
Percentage 
growth 
year on 
year 
2000 8,946.8 8.0 225.1 36% 927,627,967 44% 
2001 10,965.5 8.3 243.6 8% 1,345,494,717 45% 
2002 12,033.3 9.1 295.2 21% 1,421,667,543 6% 
2003 13,582.3 10.0 412.8 40% 1,365,309,692 -4% 
2004 15,987.8 10.1 561.2 36% 1,675,827,383 23% 
2005 18,386.8 9.9 660 18% 1,555,489,653 -7% 
2006 21,087.1 11.1 791.6 20% 1,866,677,213 20% 
2007 24,661.9 11.4 956.3 21% 1,934,301,424 4% 
2008 31,404.5 9.6 1233.1 29% 2,516,154,892 30% 
2009 33,535.3 8.7 1000.6 -18% 3,613,047,492 44% 
Sources: China GDP and total imports from chinability.com; 2009 figure for total imports 
from National Economic and Social Development National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
Information on New Zealand Exports from New Zealand Statistics’ Infoshare.  
 
Table 2 shows that following the FTA New Zealand’s exports jumped 44%, 
5% above the mark predicted by the Joint Study. Notably the 44% increase in 
2009 stands in stark contrast to the 18% decrease for China’s total imports. 
Interestingly, the similar sized gains of 2000 and 2001 occurred prior to 
China’s accession to the WTO in November 2001 before tariff rates were 
reduced. However, the year following China’s WTO accession saw a 
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significant drop in growth. This is despite the fact that the cuts in import 
tariffs that China made following its accession to the WTO were quite 
significant - a reduction in the weighted average tariff from 13.3% in 2001 to 
6.8% at the end of the implementation period in 2010, although most were to 
be gradually phased in by 2005. It should be noted, however, that these 
reductions were much smaller in comparison to the reduction of 27 
percentage points that took place in the decade prior to accession as China 
liberalised its economy in preparation for entry to the WTO (Martin, 
Bhattasali and Li, 2003: 37).14 However, significant differences existed in 
statutory tariffs and the actual level of protection for agricultural products in 
China (ibid: 43), although for New Zealand’s leading exports the main tariff 
reductions were found in dairy-related products. 
 
If the increase in trade were directly linked to the decrease in tariffs, we 
would expect to see some correlation between China’s total imports following 
WTO accession and New Zealand’s exports following the FTA 
implementation. No such correlation exists. Indeed, from the information 
presented in this table, the only constant appears to be that of volatility.  
 
An alternative explanation could be that during this time the New Zealand 
dollar altered in value, thus affecting affordability of New Zealand products 
in China. Figure 1 shows fluctuations in the value of the NZD:RMB and New 
Zealand’s total exports by volume over the same ten-year period, 2000-2009. 
As can be seen, there is no consistent connection between the volume of New 
Zealand’s exports and the value of the currency vis-à-vis the Chinese 
renminbi.  
 
 
 
                                                
14 These reductions also coincided with substantial changes in the role of the state in China’s 
economy that took place as many SOEs were either privatised or failed as the state reduced 
its financial support for them. This increased opportunities for new companies, both local and 
foreign, to replace them.  
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FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF NZ EXPORTS TO CHINA AND VALUE OF 
THE NZ DOLLAR 
 
Sources: NZ Exports to China from New Zealand Statistics’ Infoshare; Value of NZ dollar to 
Chinese RMB from Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
It is possible that within the statistics shown in Figure 1 significant 
movements in single products have been occurring, but are obscured by the 
amalgamation of all products that New Zealand exports to China. In order to 
lessen such distortions, one final graph is displayed below. Figure 2 covers 
New Zealand’s most significant exports to China on an annual basis between 
1999 and 2009 and displays the variation in year-on-year growth in exports 
between products based on the degree of change in tariff rate following the 
implementation of the FTA.15  
                                                
15 New Zealand Statistics, Infoshare. Goods were selected if the total value of the good 
exported exceeded NZ$10M for the year ending 2009. One item was excluded as being 
inappropriate for the study (Confidential Items, HS Code 9809.00, of which just over NZ$10M 
worth of goods were exported in 2009. Based upon the rate of tariff change the remaining 43 
items were placed into groups of approximately the same numerical value - no change (13), 
low change (15), medium change (12), and high change (8).  
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Figure 2: VARIATION IN GROWTH RATES BASED ON DEGREE OF 
FTA TARIFF CHANGE16 
 
Numbers shown refer to HS Codes for exported goods. See Appendix 1 for the description of 
each HS Code. Source: New Zealand Statistics’ Infoshare.  
Again, no pattern is discernable between products having a high, medium, 
low or no rate of change in their tariff. It can be clearly observed that the box 
plots for each category overlap and therefore that the means of the four 
groups are largely the same. This conclusion could be statistically tested. This 
situation is supported by the literature on links between trade policy, tariffs 
and trade flows, in which no clear link has been established (Nordås, 
Miroudot and Kowalski; 2006, 16).17  
                                                
16 The numbers on the graph represent the HS codes for particular products. Four items were 
removed from the graph, three because of the extreme variation which distorted the visual 
impression of the overall graph and one, Confidential Items, because of distorting effects (for 
example, a 19,000 percent increase one year) and because by its nature falls outside of items 
that are relevant to an FTA. 
17 It is for this reason that tariffs are usually left out gravity regressions on the determinants of 
bilateral trade.  
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Indeed, it is only when we examine individual categories of exported goods 
that we can actually see the impacts small categories of goods can have upon 
the total numbers for exported goods. While it is true that we can say that 
New Zealand’s exports to China in 2009 rose by 44% from the year prior, a 
large amount of this rise can be attributed to just two kinds of products – 
infant milk formula and lumber. This highlights one problem in trying to 
measure changes in export figures - the difference in market size between 
New Zealand and China means relatively small changes in the behaviour of 
the Chinese market can have large effects upon New Zealand’s export figures.  
Indeed, in neither of these product categories do tariff rates act as a significant 
influencing factor. Infant milk formula exports by volume increased from 
2,816,654 in 2008 to 3,624,725 in 2009, an increase of 180%. Timber exports in 
two categories18 increased by volume from 2,007,336,378 in 2008 to 
4,698,108,036 in 2009, and from 128,889,842 in 2008 to 236,043,455 in 2009 
increases of 134% and 83% respectively. The change in infant milk formula 
exports occurred primarily because of the melamine scandal that led to more 
parents purchasing imported infant formula products due to fears over the 
safety of locally made products. Timber exports increased because of 
subsidies from China’s stimulus package for low-cost housing, reconstruction 
requirements following the Sichuan earthquake and high furniture sales. 
Furthermore, Chinese timber importers, frustrated at recent years of uncertain 
supply, searched for new suppliers following a policy change in Russia which 
added substantial export tariffs to timber being exported in an attempt to 
increase the value-added portion of its exports. Rather than increasing 
processed wood exports it caused a drastic reduction in raw timber exports, 
which New Zealand timber exporters took advantage of (National Business 
Review; 2008; Acland; 2009; Ribbonwood New Zealand; 2010). However, 
timber products in this range attracted no tariffs during this period, so there 
was no advantage gained by them through the FTA. Infant milk powder still 
attracted high tariffs, and the rate of change from the FTA was low.  
                                                
18 HS Code 4403.20 Wood; coniferous, in the rough; and HS Code 4407.10 Wood, coniferous; 
sawn or chipped. 
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Summary of Part I 
 
Since the idea of an FTA with China was first raised, statements by New 
Zealand’s public officials have placed much emphasis on the reduction of 
tariffs for New Zealand goods entering China. This continues presently with 
prominence being placed upon the competitive advantage lower tariff rates 
provide New Zealand exporters. The above figures demonstrate, however, 
that the increase in New Zealand’s exports to China should not be attributed 
entirely to changes in tariff rates, as the effects upon exports are unclear.  
 
Other factors are clearly influential. The size of China’s economy when 
compared to New Zealand’s means that small changes within the Chinese 
economy can lead to big changes in New Zealand’s exports, as the figures 
revealed in respect of wood products and milk powder show. Prices will no 
doubt have some influence as well, but the factors that contribute to the 
overall price of product - currency fluctuations, transport costs, weather (for 
agricultural products) - are beyond the control of exporters. Moreover, New 
Zealand firms struggle to compete in cost-sensitive markets because few firms 
are large enough to produce at economies of scale that will be competitive in 
the Chinese market. As such, most New Zealand exporters attempt to 
compete in niche markets with products that are at the upper end of the 
market where consumers are more interested in the quality of a product than 
its price.  
 
While tariff reductions were the most publicised aspect of the FTA, another of 
the key outcomes was the easing of rules surrounding investments. If New 
Zealand is to expand its presence in the Chinese market, more firms will need 
to make investments and establish a physical presence in the country. This 
will require a move beyond the buyer/seller relationship that exists with 
exports, and means firms will need to gain a better understanding of the 
factors that are different from the New Zealand market and develop 
relationships. The next section attempts to gain a better understanding of the 
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current issues that New Zealand businesses in China may be facing by 
examining three areas that are have been issues of academic interest amongst 
scholars examining China’s reform programme.   
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PART TWO 
THE MINGLING OF THE FORMAL AND THE 
INFORMAL: THE LAW, THE STATE AND 
GUANXI IN CHINA 
 
In developing markets where commercial law is often weak and business  
practice opaque, human judgement and cultural understanding take on  
greater importance than in more developed markets…Businesspeople 
must not underestimate the difficulties of working in developing 
countries. Underdevelopment might be not only economic, but also social 
and legal (Mahon, 2009). 
The established literature on preferential trading arrangements and 
liberalised trade makes a compelling case for FTAs. Based on statements 
made in support of the FTA, the Clark Government followed this orthodoxy 
believing that by reducing tariff levies on New Zealand exports entering 
China, a considerable boost to the New Zealand economy would result. And 
indeed, trade with China has increased since the FTA was signed. The 
previous section, however, established that tariff reductions have not clearly 
affected trade; how large or small the tariff reduction was on a product did 
not significantly affect increases in Chinese purchases. Rather, the boost in 
trade was seen across many products regardless of the associated tariff level. 
The two biggest changes were seen in wood, which before the FTA was not 
subject to any tariff, and milk powder, which only received a small reduction 
in its tariff when the FTA was implemented. This section of the thesis looks to 
China itself in order to understand factors that may also be contributing to the 
increase in exports from New Zealand.  
To understand how the FTA is being implemented in China it is first 
necessary to understand more about how the Chinese economy is governed 
and the realities that businesses face when operating there. In order to do this, 
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the next section looks to the literature for an overview of recent academic 
study of China’s governance and culture and how this affects the behaviour 
of businesses and government officials.  
China, after all, is a country of considerable differences to New Zealand so it 
is not surprising that people and institutions there behave differently. China’s 
size and population mean it faces many different challenges; to meet these 
challenges its government is structured such that considerably more power 
resides with sub-national governments, compared with their counterparts in 
New Zealand. In turn, these sub-national entities have taken different 
approaches to how they implement laws and regulations, leading to a great 
deal of variance between different locations.19 A different approach to the law 
and legal institutions also exists, one that is more informal and allows for 
considerable interpretation. As such, when interpretation and implementation 
are more open for negotiation, relationships between individuals become 
more important. These informal relationships or connections are known as 
guanxi and have been attributed as one of the most important assets an 
individual or business in China can develop  
So how might this affect New Zealand’s FTA with China? The FTA was 
signed between the governments in Wellington and Beijing. But Beijing’s 
authority in Xiamen, for example, is far weaker than Wellington’s authority in 
Dunedin. There are numerous levels that exist between an official in Xiamen 
and a highly ranked official in Beijing and each of these will have a different 
set of priorities affecting how the Xiamen official should be acting – such as 
implementing the terms of the FTA.  
This section of the thesis will review academic debates and issues in three 
areas: the implementation of laws and regulations; decentralisation of 
economic governance; and the role of guanxi in China. The literature 
demonstrates that due to the process of decentralisation, local officials affect 
                                                
19 The 2008 US-China Business Council’s Members’ Priority Survey lists amongst its members 
top ten concerns the uneven enforcement of laws. 
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outcomes at the local level more than officials in Beijing. A focus on economic 
development by local government means that priority is given to local 
concerns affecting economic growth above legal changes prescribed by 
Beijing. Furthermore, companies often turn to guanxi in order to gain greater 
assurance that their interests are protected; why this is the case will also be 
reviewed.  
This section, then, seeks to demonstrate through a review of the literature 
that, compared with formal agreements with China’s central government, 
informal relationships with local government are an undervalued asset that 
firms should be seeking to develop. I do not seek here to argue that the FTA is 
not useful for New Zealand exporters, but rather that its efficacy below the 
central government cannot be assured. This is because the Chinese legal 
system is not yet independent enough to ensure reliable and speedy 
outcomes. Moreover, local officials make most of the decisions regarding 
economic activity in their jurisdictions and give priority to local concerns 
above those of Beijing. What can be useful in ensuring favourable outcomes, 
however, are informal relationships. 
The Administration of Law in China 
 
There is a long tradition throughout Chinese history of local independence 
and of the provinces putting Beijing’s decrees quietly to one side. Since the 
reform era began this traditional practice has had practical application in the 
priority local governments have placed on economic growth. A flexible 
approach to policy implementation has allowed sub-national levels of 
government to decide how laws are implemented, thereby facilitating 
economic growth (Corne, 1997; Cai and Treisman, 2006; Clark, Murrell and 
Whiting, 2008). Flexibility is part of the system, is intended, and is supported 
by the country’s leadership. For foreign governments, this raises the question 
of how much international agreements, such as FTAs, will be respected at the 
local level.  
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China also has a long legal tradition, but one that until last century was based 
on Confucian values emphasising fairness and justice rather than legality. 
Even today courts, lawyers and civil cases are considered an option of last 
resort amongst Chinese, who prefer to settle disputes through negotiation or 
with the help of a mediator. Since the mid-nineties there has been a 
determined effort to improve the state of the law books and the court system 
in China. This has not, however, challenged the established tradition of local 
officials and street-level bureaucrats having wide latitude in interpreting 
laws.  
 
Especially during the initial period in the eighties, China’s legal system was 
ill-prepared for the pace and depth of economic development that was taking 
place. Not only were law books silent on many essentials of a market 
economy, but the country also lacked lawyers – a career shunned during the 
Mao era, especially during the Cultural Revolution. While the legal system 
has developed rapidly over the last 25 years and many young people now 
study and practice law, there are still issues concerning enforcement and the 
reliability and neutrality of courts and judges. 
 
As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, a central pillar of the 
reform programme was decentralisation. Transferring economic influence 
and creating incentives for local officials to support the reforms was a key 
part of the reformers’ plans to avoid clashing with conservatives whose 
power bases were the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Beijing. Greater 
freedom to interpret regulations was part of this strategy and allowed local 
officials to make decisions that were most appropriate for local conditions, 
thereby facilitating economic development.  
 
At the street-level flexibility also exists as decisions are often left to the 
discretion of officers in charge of monitoring the activities of the households 
and businesses that reside in their jurisdiction. From members of the police, 
inspectors from bureaus responsible for ensuring enforcement of the various 
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regulations pertaining to health, labour, fire and so on, to neighbourhood 
committees, these officials of varying degrees of power can decide which 
activities should be curtailed, which can be overlooked, and, if a sanction is 
required, how harsh the punishment should be. Relationships with these 
officials is therefore quite important as a good relationship allows problems to 
be overlooked, or if that cannot be the case, for the punishment to be as light 
as possible (Bruun, 1995: 120). The consequences for foreign firms operating 
in this environment are summed up in one article looking at strategies firms 
can use to deal with officials at the local level: 
 
“the absence of commercial ground rules results in bureaucrats and 
powerful individuals interfering with private firms’ operations. These 
individuals have the power to order a firm to stop selling a certain 
product or exit a given industry altogether, and there are few well-
established institutions to prevent them from doing otherwise. 
Enforcement of existing legal and regulatory codes can also be selective 
and arbitrary. Regulations tend to be interpreted by whoever has 
authority over a given geographical region or by one of many 
government departments that has jurisdiction over the firm” (Ahlstrom, 
Bruton and Lui, 2000: 5-6).   
 
Corne (1997) advances the idea of ‘legal flexibility’ in China – that laws are 
intentionally written in vague terms in China to allow broad scope for 
interpretation.20 His analysis of Chinese laws shows the following common 
characteristics: 
 
- Principle-like pronouncements 
- Vagueness and ambiguity 
- Undefined terms 
                                                
20 Peter Howard Corne, Foreign investment in China: the administrative legal system, 1997 
see chapter 3: Legal Flexibility, pages 94-145. Similar viewpoints are expressed in Irene Y. M. 
Yeung and Rosalie L. Tung “Achieving business success in Confucian societies: The 
importance of guanxi (connections)” Organizational Dynamics 25 (2) 1996: 54-65.  
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- Broadly worded discretions 
- Omissions 
- General catch-all phrases 
 
This approach is apt given the priority Zhongnanhai has placed on economic 
development, or, as Corne describes it: “China has opted for a legal system 
that is in essence as fluid and changeable as the economy and society which it 
is supposed to regulate” (1997: 94). The rapidly changing nature of the 
economy means that laws could restrict economically beneficial behaviour or 
detract from the primary goal of economic development. Allowing local 
authorities discretion in interpretation places a check upon such events.21  
 
Irregular implementation is not just a problem at the local level. The priorities 
for the CPC remain economic development and a harmonious society. 
Membership of international organisations that will aid these goals is sought, 
as it demonstrates the continuing emergence of China as a world power. 
Accession to the WTO is a good example of these priorities – it helped China’s 
economic development, presented an opportunity for economic liberalisation 
to be implemented, and showed China’s leadership gaining status on the 
world stage. FTAs, although on a smaller scale, would offer the same benefits.  
When membership of international organisations threatens economic 
development or to destabilise society, implementation is less likely to fully 
occur because there is no level of government that has an overriding interest 
in seeing that international agreements are implemented.  
 
For foreign businesses, used to operating in environments of greater legal 
certainty, this will often be unfamiliar ground. The problems below are just 
some examples of issues facing foreign and local companies alike in China:  
 
                                                
21 Of course local governments in protecting their own jurisdiction have infringed upon the 
greater national economic interest as well, such as in the early nineties when internal trade 
barriers were erected by local governments seeking to protect local industry and boost 
revenue by adding taxes to goods being transported through their districts.  
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• The same law can be interpreted differently by officials from different 
local bodies. 
• Local laws may clash with national laws, so that the means of acting 
correctly can be unclear or even impossible to achieve. 
• Directives issued by one authority may contradict those issues by 
another, leaving officials as confused as businesses and slowing down 
processes (Wang, 2000: 535). 
 
China’s entry into the WTO raised doubts about China’s ability to enforce its 
international agreements. The legal revisions that were necessary for 
accession involved a large commitment to improving the legal environment, 
but the liberal language and rhetoric of laws reveal that the objectives of 
Beijing’s leadership circle were economic and social rather than legal (Ya Qin, 
2007: 721). The changes that are taking place have seen a shift away from rule 
by man, but instead of rule of law the new environment is “rule through law” 
in which the state has been using law to achieve its objectives rather than 
establishing the legal system as an independent check on state power (Kong, 
2001: 1187). 
 
Furthermore, there is considerable doubt as to whether laws that do not fit a 
country’s stage of development are likely to be successfully implemented. 
Pistor argues that the contents of laws are of “secondary importance to the 
process of legal development and the compatibility of new laws with pre-
existing conditions” (2000: vii). Given the rapid development of China’s 
economy, it is appropriate to question whether one should expect any 
agreements China signs to be fully or accurately implemented by local 
authorities.  
 
A large number of laws covering foreign investment have been passed during 
the reform system, but enforcement of those laws has not been 
comprehensive. Many companies, foreign and local alike, have been 
frustrated, as those with good connections with local officials appear able to 
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flout the law and regulations, taking advantage of the large amount of 
discretion local officials have been given by higher levels of government as 
well as weak enforcement by courts. Particularly in the nineties, companies 
often sought to improve their connections with government by hiring officials 
or family members of officials. These people would be appointed to high 
positions in the firm or on the board of directors, or given an ownership stake 
in the company, but these were often little more than sinecures. Another 
method was to hire as consultants people who were believed to have good 
guanxi so that their connections could be used to facilitate introductions 
(Pearce and Robinson, 2000:34). One must assume that businesspeople make 
these decisions because the rewards outweigh the costs. 
 
The Decentralised Structure of the People’s Republic of China 
 
Each state makes a trade-off in the structure of its political system, balancing 
the ability of its leaders to effectively implement policies against establishing 
checks and balances that ensure power cannot be unilaterally wielded by one 
person, group, or institution (Cox and McCubbins, 2001: 21). Countries whose 
political system gives equal weight to these two factors are more likely to be 
able to deliver competent governance and structure incentives in order to 
promote economic growth (Kong, 2005: 55). During the Mao years the 
negative consequences of too much power resting in one person’s hands 
became clear. Since then power has become more widely dispersed 
throughout the Chinese state. This in turn has facilitated the reform 
programme by improving the government’s responsiveness to changing 
economic factors and the needs of the population – no mean achievement in a 
state with the population of China.  
 
The reform programme has had an enormous impact not only upon the 
economy but also on the practice of governance (Yang, 1994: 541-542).22 
                                                
22 Below the national level, China’s constitution provides for three levels of government - 
provincial, county and township, but there are a number of exceptions of which both 
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Decision-making powers have moved between central and local government 
as Beijing has sought to find a balance between controlling local authorities 
and allowing them to find pathways to economic development that best suits 
local conditions. The diversity that can be found across China – levels of 
development, access to resources, infrastructure and employment 
opportunities, for example – mean that a ‘one size fits all’ approach from 
Beijing would be ill-suited in many parts of the country. By allowing 
decisions to be made at the local level more appropriate policies can be 
implemented.  
 
When Beijing signs an international agreement such as an FTA, the 
implementation of aspects of that agreement falls in many respects to local 
authorities. Approval for most investment decisions, for example, is made at 
the local administration level. In a country of China’s size, in which the power 
of economic decision-making is not held strongly by the central government, 
of what value are the agreements it signs with other states? If local authorities 
place local interests above those of the agreements Beijing signs, it is likely 
that the provisions of the agreement may not be implemented as was 
intended by the signatories.  
 
The Consequences of Decentralisation on Economic Decision-Making in China 
 
China’s reforms begun in the late seventies, spread steadily during the 
eighties and were accepted for the most part entirely by the mid-nineties. By 
the time of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s transition from 
command economy to market economy was complete, at least from an 
ideological perspective if not in a practical sense. Today the economic benefits 
appear obvious, but reaching this point has been an evolving process 
                                                                                                                                      
Shanghai and Xiamen are examples that provide local officials with greater autonomy than 
most other cities. Shanghai is a municipality and is treated in a similar fashion as a province 
in its own right (as are the other municipalities, Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing). Xiamen 
meanwhile is a sub-provincial city coming under the authority of Fujian province. Unlike 
most cities of its size, though, Xiamen has greater independence to set its own economic 
policies, laws and regulations, reflecting its pioneering role as an SEZ.  
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throughout the thirty years of economic reform.  
 
China has always been quite decentralised with Beijing often struggling 
against fiefdoms, warlords and local officials unwilling to automatically 
follow directives issued by Beijing.23 Deng Xiaoping’s reforms came at a time 
when central power was at a low point – Mao’s Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution had left the bureaucracies weakened; the public, as well, 
unhappy with the lack of progress during the last decade, was open to new 
approaches (Shirk, 1993: 13). Today, political control resides mostly in Beijing, 
although at the village level some leaders are democratically appointed. 
Responsibility for economic development, however, is mainly held at the 
provincial and municipal levels. So while Beijing therefore controls 
macroeconomic policy, the issues that directly impact most businesses are the 
responsibility of local officials down.   
 
China’s economic growth since the reform programme began has sparked 
much debate with academic circles regarding China’s development and its 
sustainability. According to North and Weingast, the economic success of 
developed western economies occurred because of strong legal institutions 
that guaranteed property rights and gave investors certainty that their 
investments and profit would be returned to them (North and Weingast; 
1989: 803). China’s growth has challenged this because these same guarantees 
do not exist in China. Jean Oi (1992), whose work examined Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs), argued that owners and investors in TVEs did in 
fact have a fair expectation that their investments would be returned to them, 
but this was guaranteed through the close relationships formed between 
entrepreneurs and local officials. Changes that had taken place in the eighties 
that allowed local authorities access to tax revenues generated within their 
jurisdictions motivated officials to form these relationships with 
                                                
23 A common Chinese saying is “Beijing has its policies, we have our regulations”, meaning 
that any law passed by central government can be negated by local officials by creating their 
own policies.  
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entrepreneurs and encourage investment and economic development, rather 
than engage in rent-seeking behaviour. 
 
This debate still continues. Some argue that the policy of allowing economic 
decision-making to take place at the local level did not drive China’s 
‘economic miracle’. Rather, it took place because of clashes at the central 
government level between rival factions with opposing ideological 
predispositions who sought support from local officials, in turn assisting 
them in order to demonstrate the efficacy of their chosen policies. Cai and 
Treisman (2006) point in particular to the fact that the two periods of greatest 
growth were in the late seventies and early eighties, and again in the mid-
nineties, when power was most centralized. The key point missed by Cai and 
Treisman, however, is that the reforms and institutional learning that they do 
acknowledge as being key to growth, were a slow and gradual process that 
took many years to disseminate throughout the economy and influence 
growth statistics. Furthermore, they fail to give adequate recognition that the 
large amounts of FDI during these periods was a major factor behind 
economic growth – something that was almost entirely absent in the ex-Soviet 
Union states that they offer as a comparison case. A key point remains, 
however, being that local officials are still working with firms to promote 
economic growth; Cai and Treisman may question the factors that drove local 
officials to act in this way, but they are not denying that local officials play a 
key role in assisting economic development in their jurisdictions.  
 
Over the last two decades scholars have begun to study the relationships that 
exist between entrepreneurs and officials and how this has affected China’s 
economic development (Nee, 1992; Wank, 1996; Krug, 2000: 15-18; Thun, 
2006). These studies describe their findings in a number of ways – network 
capitalism, state corporatism, hybrid capitalism, patron-client relationships – 
but they all essential describe a similar phenomenon: collaboration between 
local officials and entrepreneurs in order to generate economic activity. What 
has emerged is that officials can greatly assist firms, and that many are 
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willing to be flexible in their implementation of rules and regulations if they 
believe a greater good will come about as a result. As Jean Oi described 
succinctly, “…when officials are forced to choose between protecting local 
interests and adhering strictly to central policies, the choice is clear” (1999: 
178).  
 
The programme of decentralisation is believed to be a key factor in China’s 
rapid economic growth. It provided economic incentives for officials to 
support economic development projects while at the same time allowing 
them room to find approaches that suited local circumstances. This system 
was not restricted to local businesses. Local governments’ economic 
development goals could not be met solely through the ability of local 
companies. Local governments therefore also extended their assistance to 
foreign companies who they believed could help develop the local economy 
(Thun, 2006). This arrangement continues today where foreign firms can 
bring investments, technology and skills to a local area. As shall be detailed in 
the section describing the experiences of New Zealand firms in China, some 
New Zealand firms are working within this system to expand their contacts 
and business.  
 
While early research on links between business and government focused on 
guanxi relations between individuals, more recent work has arisen arguing 
that the state is more involved than ever before. Government officials’ focus 
on economic development has seen the rise of “localistic networks”. Whereas 
guanxi relationships exist between individuals, these networks see the 
effective policy of entire bureaus being to support local firms. This is done 
broadly by defining policies and procedures that benefit firms in their 
jurisdiction, and directly by supporting firms as they seek to build their 
business networks (Wank, 2002: 114). 
 
The extent of government involvement in the Chinese economy is still a hotly 
debated topic and partly why some countries withhold designating China as 
 45 
a market economy. While in many ways China appears to have embraced the 
free market, Huang (2008) argues that the last twenty years have in fact seen a 
decline in market liberalisation. Huang’s description of Shanghai is not the 
model of market liberalisation that World Bank officials describe the city, but 
rather an example of a “classic industrial-policy state” (212). Shanghai 
officials, Huang argues, have driven the rapid economic development of 
Shanghai not only at the cost of local entrepreneurial activity by favouring 
foreign firms, but also by subsidising the city’s infrastructure growth through 
central revenues, backing for SOEs and large amounts of FDI. In many ways, 
Huang’s argument returns us to the mid-nineties when some denied that 
Asia’s growth was a ‘miracle’, but rather a simple case of increased inputs 
creating greater outputs (Krugman, 1994). 
 
Demonstrating similarities with both Huang and Wank, is Eric Thun’s work 
on the development of the auto sector in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong. 
Thun describes three different levels of corporatist behaviour by local 
government.24 The first of these is the local development state in which local 
officials play an active role in assisting local companies and are “unified and 
cohesive in their mission to cultivate and develop local firms” (2006: 28). This 
provided the businesses Thun studied added certainty that they would 
receive a return on their investment. But local officials went further, assisting 
chosen businesses and developing relationships between supply firms and 
their customers so that they resembled a vertically integrated firm. This 
improved communication between the companies on how products were to 
be improved or efficiencies found. This is a long-term perspective with the 
goal of having all the firms involved growing together over the years.  
 
Thun’s second pattern of development is the laissez-faire local state in which 
the local bureaucracy is fragmented and normal market relations exist 
                                                
24 Krug and Hendrischke found similar groups, though their labelling differs from Thun’s, 
using the terms “Arm’s Length State”, “Developmental State” and “Pre-Corporatist State”; as 
the names imply the attributes of the three groups are much alike. See Barbara Krug and 
Hans Hendrischke “Framing China: Transformation and Institutional Change through co-
evolution” Management and Organization Review 4 (1): 81–108. 
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between firms. In this pattern different government groups are responsible 
for different firms so that they act at cross-purposes or without coherency, as 
the local government bodies are not unified in their aims. Furthermore, the 
businesses involved have only market relations with each other and multiple 
suppliers are frequently used, often competing on price.25  
Thun’s final pattern is the firm-dominated locality. In this pattern the business 
groups were national in orientation and their focus lacked involvement by 
local officials who were incapable of providing financial support, unable to 
alter policy to support the firm, or incapable of providing guaranteed markets 
for the firms’ products. 
The motivations for firms to develop connections with local government will 
obviously be different depending on their circumstances, but by examining 
the behaviour and opinions of Chinese firms such as those Thun studied, 
lessons can be found. The discretion that officials have at their disposal 
motivates some, as a positive relationship increases the chances for a firm of 
influencing the behaviour of local government to gain benefits, or at least 
minimise costs, which David Wank speaks to: 
 
“At the level of local government, [decentralisation] enhances autonomy in 
administration, control over revenue production, and responsibility for fiscal funding. 
Governments now have more responsibilities, less centrally allocated resources to 
achieve them, and greater autonomy to devise solutions. Increasingly they have 
turned to their regulatory powers in the market economy to derive income in such 
myriad ways as ad hoc levies of taxes and fines and various kinds of relations with 
private entrepreneurs” (2002: 101).  
 
The scarcity of reliable information is another common problem in China. 
Close links with bureaucrats who have access to official sources of 
                                                
25 This is a problem that probably arises when there is a disagreement between competing 
ministries and authorities over how or which groups are supported and different factions 
side with particular companies.  
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information as well as access to proposals being discussed behind the oblique 
walls of government can also provide valuable notifications and insights for 
businesses (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008: 94). 
 
Unlike most other East Asian corporatist states, such as South Korea, Taiwan 
or Japan, China’s embrace of corporatist behaviour26 was designed to loosen 
centralized control rather than tighten it (Unger and Chan, 1995: 38-39). 
Decentralization provided the most flexibility in the dynamic times of the 
eighties and nineties. By allowing decisions to be made at the local level, 
officials could respond in the most appropriate manner and act accordingly 
given their better knowledge of the facts on the ground than those of officials 
in central government. It also gave the country an opportunity to experiment 
with different systems for economic success – winning strategies being 
implemented on a wider scale, and poor strategies being cast aside before 
damage was done on too wide a scale. Decentralization of administrative 
power and revenue collection thus encouraged officials to follow strategies 
that maximized growth and revenue while also giving them tested growth 
strategies to emulate (Thun, 2006: 16-17).  
 
The corporatist approach employed across China brought together the private 
sector with local government who were able to assist firms through state 
agencies as well as signalling their approval for their business activities. 
Government approval was an important asset for firms during the reform 
period because of the uncertain state of property rights and the unreliable 
nature of legal institutions during the reform era. However, the state 
corporatism approach, for all its benefits, brought with it negative 
repercussions in the form of corruption and the establishment of clientist 
networks.  
 
                                                
26 By corporatist behaviour I refer generically to the works of a number of scholars who have 
examined links between China’s firms and local governments, such as state corporatism - Oi 
(1992), network capitalism – Boisot and Child (1996), and market clientism – Wank, 1996.  
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Decentralisation has meant that engagement with local officials became 
extremely important for businesses, and many foreign companies in China 
now acknowledge the important role that working with local government can 
have on their business. While in the past foreign companies dealt mainly with 
the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, today far more of China’s 
government bodies have responsibilities that see them dealing with foreign 
companies on a regular basis (Wang, 2000: 540; Jarret and Lie, 2009: 36-39). On 
top of its role as regulator, local government is often a customer as well, 
allowing some companies to develop closer relationships, but adding a 
further layer of complexity to the relationship.  
 
The patterns that Oi first saw occurring in the late eighties continue today 
with local government in China being closely aligned with the businesses in 
their jurisdiction. Examining the impact of reforms on the changing nature of 
the state in China, Goodman concludes “The governmental system has 
become highly decentralised with the exercise of state power resting largely 
in the hands of the community of interest that has been created between local 
cadres and entrepreneurs” (2009: 446).  
 
While these operating conditions may be foreign to most New Zealanders, 
there is little they can do to alter the system in which they find themselves. 
There is a fixation amongst many government officials with achieving GDP 
growth in their jurisdiction, not only for the greater good of China, but also in 
order to further their careers, which is neatly summed by a New Zealand 
businessman:  
 
One great fault in the emergence of market forces and the rapid expansion 
of the economy is the Chinese national obsession with growth. True 
growth is a subtle quality in any economy. In China this seems well 
understood by the central government but is often neglected by provincial 
governments chasing short-term GDP targets and industrial development. 
Economic growth is to many officials the new Chinese ideology, as deeply 
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rooted and as blindly followed as any Communist principle of the past” 
(Mahon, 2010).  
 
Eric Thun’s study on the Shanghai’s ‘local development state’ and the auto 
sector’s growth there, demonstrates the role that local officials have played in 
promoting local economic development and that foreign enterprises have not 
been excluded from receiving support from local officials (2006). Indeed, 
much of Yasheng Huang’s work has demonstrated that foreign enterprises 
have in some ways been provided with advantages over local firms to ensure 
that local growth targets, employment levels and technology transfers were 
achieved (2003; 2008). While Thun describes a positive story of the local 
government’s role in promoting growth, the opposite can also occur when 
officials stand in the way of development, restrict access to land of materials, 
or alter regulations that limit a firm’s ability to operate. 
 
If even laws written in Beijing are not strictly enforced across China it would 
seem that local authorities will be prone to selective enforcement and 
implementation of agreements that Beijing has signed with other nations. For 
these reasons, then, it becomes clearer why having good relationships with 
government officials in China is so often emphasised. China’s legal system 
and political structure give officials at lower levels far more power than in 
most other countries. The vagueness of the operating environment and the 
constant changes that occur mean businesses are disadvantaged if they are 
not capable of forming positive relationships with officials (Walton, 2008: 46-
49; Jarrett and Lie, 2009: 36-39). To some observers, the ability to connect with 
officialdom is key to successful business operations in China, in the words of 
Kenneth Lieberthal: “the competitive advantage of most Chinese 
manufacturing firms comes in large part from their superior ability to 
understand and ‘work’ the political dimensions of their own economy”(2006: 
58). The question for this project then becomes, are New Zealand firms 
capable of ‘working’ the system as well? And if so, does the positive 
relationship that has developed between the governments of New Zealand 
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and China be transferred in some way down to the local level where so many 
important economic decisions are made?  
 
The process of decentralisation has affected how local officials and businesses 
interact with each other in order to achieve mutually beneficial objectives. In a 
country the size of China, firms have to be quite large in order for them reach 
a level where they attract the attention of local officials. Few New Zealand 
firms exist that would normally met this criteria. But as shall be shown in Part 
III of this thesis, evidence gathered in interviews with New Zealand firms in 
China shows that the FTA has provided a platform for New Zealand firms to 
meet with local officials that would usually not exist and though them 
develop informal relationships and broaden their business opportunities.  
 
The Effects of Decentralisation on Foreign Companies at Street-Level 
 
Street-level bureaucrats are responsible for the issuing of licenses and 
checking compliance with regulations, and thus have the ability to fine or 
even shut a company down for not complying with laws and regulations. For 
larger companies, issues can extend much further as the discretion local 
officials maintain extends to allocation of resources, local taxation, 
investment, licensing, and land management, to name just a few of the areas 
that they can hold significant influence over (Goodman, 2009: 442).  
 
At street-level, dealing with the state may not be such a high stakes game, but 
outcomes can also be positive or negative. The number of licenses to attain 
and regulations to meet can weigh heavy upon small businesses. Street-level 
officials have the discretion to decide which of these are required and which 
ones they can look the other way on. For a small business, such as most New 
Zealand businesses are, these interactions are important for the smooth 
running of their business.  
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No matter how tightly worded any policy is, when it comes to actual 
implementation, guaranteeing that it will be carried out by bureaucrats at the 
‘street-level’ is very difficult. Implementation problems at street-level are a 
concern of the civil service not just in developing economies, but also in 
developed economies with structured and well-regulated bureaucracies. 
Lipsky’s study of bureaucracy (1980), and the work of others who have 
followed, demonstrated that bureaucrats involved in the provision of public 
services regularly adopt practices inconsistent with policy due to overwork 
and cumbersome rules and procedures. Increasing amounts of control sought 
through additional procedures or rules tend to fail to control the behaviour of 
street-level bureaucrats and only cause greater rifts between upper 
management levels and staff. Yet it is their actions on a collective scale that 
reflect the actual policy of a public agency.27   
 
While Lipsky’s study was based in England, what we know of how China’s 
street-level bureaucracy is equally revealing. Street-level bureaucrats in China 
can be, in some cases, a virtual law to themselves, with their decisions based 
very much on their relationship with whomever they are dealing. Ole Bruun, 
an ethnographer who based himself in a Chengdu neighbourhood for several 
years, wrote that the street-level bureaucrats there: 
 
“…tend to confine their work to well-defined spheres, and distinction among these is 
often based on local, even personal, interpretations rather than compliance with legal 
duties. Interdepartmental cooperation is minimal. Bureaus reproduce a pattern of 
organization as required by central government, but contradictory to their local 
purpose. Bureaucratic seclusion within discrete units and the almost absolute power 
of leading cadres of each bureau offer ample opportunity for malpractice. Examples of 
such are the deliberate abuse of power, overlapping personal and professional 
interests, or, as is still frequently the case, insufficient knowledge of states policies and 
current regulations”(1995: 111).  
                                                
27 Also see Steven Maynard-Moody, Michael Musheno and Dennis Palumbo “Street-Wise 
Social Policy: Resolving the Dilemma of Street-Level Influence and Successful 
Implementation” The Western Political Quarterly 43(4), 1990: 833-848.  
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Those who ran businesses in the neighbourhood were mostly disparaging of 
the work of the various bureaucrats who had responsibility for overseeing 
their activities, complaining often that they charged them too much in taxes 
and fees and offered little back in the way of services they were meant to. The 
businesses also complained that the more successful a business was, the more 
visits they received from local bureaus. In many ways they complained that 
the bureaus served the interests of those they favoured. Few business owners, 
however, bothered to complain about the demands that were made of them, 
either silently acquiescing or attempting to alter the demands more in their 
favour through “guanxi-type relationships” (120).  
 
One of Lipsky’s questions was “what if workers do not share the objectives of 
their superiors?” In situations where workers lack the affinity of their 
superiors with the goals of an organisation, where they consider orders from 
above to be illegitimate, or can find counter methods that block regulations 
coming into effect, implementation of policy as written is doubtful (1980: 16-
17). All three of these situations have applicability to China, and not just at 
street-level. Owing to the decentralised nature of China’s political structure 
even officials at high levels of provincial and municipal government will have 
objectives such as increasing revenue collection or support of local businesses 
that could clash with Beijing’s international agreements. 
 
Officials in China also realise the declining significance of Beijing in their jobs. 
The local bureaucracy is likely to be more obligated to local leaders than to 
higher levels of the state apparatus (Goodman, 2009: 444). The market reforms 
have created uncertainty for government workers, who often take a 
government job despite the lower wages because of the increased job security. 
As their wages have declined relative to the private sector, so too have 
resources from Beijing. Consequently officials are more likely to look towards 
their local jurisdictions in hope of finding resources and support (Wank, 1996: 
823). Where it occurs, corruption buttresses the declining value of their salary, 
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while taxes and fees from private businesses support local government as a 
revenue source.  
 
While this situation may not be the ideal situation that a business hopes to 
operate in, given that they have made the decision to operate in China, they 
must accept that this is the reality in which they find themselves. What they 
can control is how they choose to behave and adapt to the Chinese system as 
best they can. In order to do this, it is important that they understand guanxi, 
for as a popular saying goes “China is a land of guanxi…Nothing can be done 
without guanxi” (Y. Ju quoted in Tsang, 1998: 67).  
 
Guanxi and its future in a changing society  
 
As the last two sections have described, the state maintains a strong presence 
in China’s political economy, but within an environment of flexible policy and 
regulation implementation. In situations where laws and regulations are open 
to interpretation, good relationships with officials can be vital, not only with 
street-level bureaucrats who check compliance, but also with local officials of 
municipal and provincial areas who have influence with civic leaders and 
policymakers. This section looks at the informal relationships, or guanxi, 
between businesses and state representatives that bind these factors together 
and current academic debate about guanxi’s future.  
 
Rapid economic development has seen government play an active 
interventionist role in guiding the economy along a prescribed pathway to 
economic growth. Although the command economy belongs to a bygone era, 
five year plans are still developed at the central government level setting 
goals for the bureaucracy to achieve. These goals filter down through the 
layers of the Chinese government with officials and bureaucrats being 
responsible in their own small way for their attainment. Ambitious local 
officials strive to reach these goals in order to further their careers.  
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Studies of business and official behaviour in China have demonstrated that a 
cooperative approach between businesses and government officials has been 
instrumental in the rapid development of China’s economy (Oi, 1992; Boisot 
and Child, 1996; Wang, 2000; Wank, 2002; Thun, 2006). These relationships 
are key to becoming part of the system within which firms can develop a 
competitive advantage. China’s rapidly developing economy has had a 
tremendous effect upon the business governance and the culture; a firm’s 
guanxi with local officials can assist it to navigate this rapidly changing 
climate, avoiding pitfalls and developing opportunities.  
 
The relationships with local officials that Oi argued gave de facto property 
rights to local entrepreneurs, has also been an area academic debate. Around 
the time that Oi’s work appeared, an ethnographer, Mayfair Yang, published 
Gifts, Favours and Banquets, in which she argued that informal relationships, or 
guanxi, were central to understanding the behaviour of China’s nascent 
entrepreneurs and economy. Through guanxi connections Yang argued, 
individuals could trade favours, goods and information which helped them 
economically (Yang; 1994).  
 
How much guanxi was an essential feature of Chinese culture is often 
questioned, however. Some argue that guanxi’s rise can be traced back to the 
era of the command economy, but, now that market forces exist in China and 
stronger legal institutions are appearing, people prefer to utilise them and 
will increasingly continue to do so as they improve. Guanxi, it is argued, is an 
inefficient allocation of resources that will not survive market pressures. 
While guanxi was useful in providing access to goods in a command 
economy, a market economy provides these more cheaply and through 
simple buyer-seller relations that are less costly in terms of time than guanxi 
relations. Similarly, people will increasingly use legal institutions to resolve 
disputes as they become more reliable (Guthrie, 1998).  
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Although the practices that resemble guanxi, or “special relationships” as it is 
often translated, have existed for a long period throughout China’s history the 
word itself is relatively new, not featuring in either the 1915 Ci Yuan or the 
1940 Ci Hai.28 Some scholars go as far as to describe guanxi as the key to 
understanding the Chinese and their conduct (Langenburg, 2007: 2). 
Although this could well be an overstatement – connections, friendships and 
networks are obviously important across all cultures and facilitate business 
and politics in all societies – it should be not treated lightly, as guanxi is 
regularly attributed as being a leading factor for business success.29 Boisot and 
Child (1996) perhaps say it best when they state:  
 
“It is therefore not the presence of networking that is distinctive about 
China’s emerging economic order but, rather, the depth and nature of its 
social embeddedness.”30  
 
Likewise Wang makes similarly strong statements: 
 
“[I]nformal networks in Chinese society stand out for three reasons: (1) 
the degree to which informal networks contradict and undermine formal 
institutions is extremely high; (2) the influence of informal networks is 
unusually strong in every aspect of Chinese life; and (3) the level of 
institutionalisation of Chinese networks is very low” (2000: 531).  
 
Even for many Chinese, defining guanxi is difficult, as Yang found when she 
began her ethnographic study by asking her acquaintances what guanxi was, 
only to find no agreed-upon definition by the practitioners she was studying 
                                                
28 Langenburg gives a thorough etymological and historical explanation for guanxi. See Eike 
Langenburg “Guanxi and Business Strategy: Theories and Implications for Multinational 
Companies in China” Contributions to Management Science Springer, 2007. 
29 Yeung and Tung quote Jacobs et al, “A survey on 2,000 Chinese from Shanghai and 
Qungpu showed that 92.4 per cent of the respondents regarded guanxi as important for their 
daily lives” another study of 19 businesses in China “showed that guanxi was a necessary 
condition for a company’s financial performance and ultimately long-term business success.” 
Both studies were conducted in the early to mid-nineties. See Yeung and Tung (1996): 166.   
30 Max Boisot and John Child “From Fiefs to Clans and network Capitalism: Explaining 
China’s Emerging Economic Order” Administrative Science Quarterly 41 1996: 623. 
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(1994: 49); such are the challenges for those studying a social phenomena that 
only exists informally and outside of any institution. Likewise, there is no 
readily agreed upon English translation of the word of guanxi. The most 
common translations found in the literature are “social connections” (Yang, 
1994: 1), “relationship or connection” (Yeung and Tung, 1996: 55), “a network 
of relationships” (Pearce and Robinson, 2000: 31), “informal personal 
relationships” (Wang, 2000: 534), “personal connections” (Jacobs, Belschak 
and Krug, 2004: 166), or “social capital” (Luo, 2007: 41), or mixtures and 
variations of all of the above. An apt description for guanxi is a point of 
conjecture, I believe, because the concept of guanxi is closely intertwined with 
two other concepts crucial to Chinese character – social obligation (renqing) 
and face (mianzi). Both ideas are felt on such a deeper level by the Chinese, 
that the English language lacks words to succinctly transmit the true meaning 
that guanxi conveys in Mandarin.  
 
Paraphrasing Bourdieu’s definition of social capital, Luo describes guanxi as: 
 
“a form of social capital which creates economic value. Unlike economic 
capital, in which money or commodities are incorporated into circuits of 
production in order to produce more money, social capital is an aggregate 
of actual or potential resources linked to possession of a durable network 
of more or less institutionalised relationships. Mutual acquaintance and 
recognition provide credentials which entitle people to various kinds of 
credit” (2007: 41). 
 
Throughout the eighties and the nineties the ‘art and practice’ of guanxi 
became a popular topic of study in China-focused business magazines and 
academic literature alike. As China became wealthier and the market 
economy increased the supply of goods and services, use of guanxi to obtain 
the basics of life declined. But new uses for the old practice appeared. Guanxi 
became useful to obtain what was now desired – access to better educational 
opportunities for one’s children, transfer to a better danhui (workgroup), and 
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introductions and connections that helped one in the business world. Private 
entrepreneurs and officials alike began using guanxi networks to obtain goods 
and services at low prices, products that were in short supply, such as steel 
and electricity, and favourable government contracts and connections that 
could help them access government-controlled resources and assets, such as 
land.  
 
Two primary schools of thought exist when attempting to explain how guanxi 
as it exists today came to be – the sentimentalists, such as Mayfair Yang, who 
look to China’s past and its cultural traditions, and the instrumentalists, such 
as Oi and Guthrie, who explain guanxi as a consequence of the command 
economy and weak legal system and question the ‘Chineseness’ of guanxi.31 
The current debate centres around whether guanxi is an evolving feature of 
Chinese society that will continue to affect how business is conducted as the 
Chinese economy develops, or whether guanxi was a feature of the command 
economy that, if China develops a rational-legal system and market 
mechanisms, will steadily disappear.  
 
For the instrumentalists, guanxi served as a survival system through which 
people could protect themselves from the vagaries of the state, especially 
during periods such as the Cultural Revolution. Some claim that historically 
guanxi was practiced more in the rural areas of China and was absorbed and 
brought back to the cities by the urban youth who spent time in the 
countryside during the Communist era (Yang, 1994: 76). There is general 
consensus, however, that it was during those most turbulent times of the Mao 
era that the practice of guanxi become a prominent aspect of Chinese society and its 
use became focused on its instrumental application.  
 
                                                
31 Many scholars of course seek a middle path. Yeung and Tung firstly explain guanxi 
through Confucian roots, but argue that its prevalence and instrumental uses expanded 
greatly under communism; they do not however think the development of China’s legal 
system will in any way diminish the importance of guanxi.  
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Those of the Yang school of thought believe the declining role of the Chinese 
state means that guanxi will become more important as individuals seek to 
alleviate the harsh side effects of the market economy. Those more inclined to 
Guthrie’s perspective claim the use of guanxi began a period of slow decline 
during the eighties and nineties, which will continue as China’s economy 
improves, market constraints force economic actors to put material profit 
before the unquantifiable benefits promised through guanxi, and the legal 
system strengthens.  
 
Academic Study of Guanxi  
 
Given that they had been kept from studying its society for so long, it wasn’t 
long after China opened its doors that academics arrived and began to 
examine China. One of the earlier academics, ethnographer Mayfair Yang, 
published one of the first and most important works on guanxi, Gifts, Favors, 
& Banquets, that examined the role of guanxi and guanxixue (the practice of 
guanxi) in China in the early eighties. Yang’s China was connected through 
webs of gift giving and favours that enabled people to obtain goods and 
services that were hard to find – special foods, train tickets, good housing and 
so on. Those who Yang studied thought strategically about how they could 
develop relationships and obligations that would enable them to obtain 
through informal channels goods and services that otherwise were beyond 
their reach.  
 
During the early eighties when Yang was in China, although life was still 
tough for most Chinese, the country was embarking upon Gaige Kaifang 
(programme of reform and openness). New laws had been passed 
encouraging foreign investment and opening China’s economy to market 
forces. In order to get ahead in this environment, guanxi was another 
instrument that could give a comparative advantage to those who wielded it 
effectively. Guanxixue was therefore being extended beyond the personal 
sphere into business. Despite official condemnation of using guanxi, Yang 
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found its use amongst managers of state-run companies to obtain raw 
materials, labour and even tax breaks from local officials. Cadres were 
perceived to be able to la guanxi  (pull guanxi) the most because of their social 
position, control of resources, and the low amount of oversight of their 
actions by superiors (1994: 77-87).  
 
How ‘Chinese’ guanxi is is a question many scholars have debated. Those like 
Yang who look for backwards into China’s culture and history to explain 
guanxi make solid arguments based upon the ‘in-group’ or collectivist nature 
of Chinese culture compared to what is found in the West, which is far more 
based on individualism. As Jacobs, Belschak and Krug note, guanxi networks 
are based upon concepts strongly held in Chinese social groups such as 
loyalty, moral obligation and norms of reciprocity (2004: 170). However, they 
find that traditional views that guanxi is based mostly upon relationships of 
blood and family no longer hold true in modern China.  
 
Examining cultural reasons for guanxi is problematic, however, especially in a 
country such as China that is experiencing such rapid social change. Some of 
the literature therefore looks towards economic factors for the practice of 
guanxi. As mentioned above, many academics believe that the reason for the 
increases in guanxi activity during the Mao and Deng eras was a response to 
the shortage of goods that the centrally planned economy did not provide for, 
as well as a risk-hedging strategy to compensate for the lack of strong, reliable 
legal institutions. Consequentially, as China’s economy moves increasingly 
towards a free market economy and China’s legal system becomes more 
independent and able to carry out its constitutionally prescribed duties, it is 
believed that individuals’ need for guanxi may well diminish (Luo, 2007: 33).  
 
Blood-based guanxi ties may well continue as it is culturally embedded within 
Chinese culture, but as legal institutions are strengthened, instrumentalists 
argue, the need for social-based guanxi will diminish. In the business realm 
guanxi with national government officials will become less important as the 
 60 
process of decentralisation continues, thereby increasing the need for guanxi 
with local officials (Luo, 2007: 32). For foreigner companies this is a two-
edged sword; greater legal enforcement will appeal to western firms who will 
feel more comfortable having a legal environment that more closely mirrors 
that found at home. However, if guanxi is culturally based, foreign firms in 
China will become more disadvantaged unless they become familiar with the 
application of guanxi. 
 
But how much of what Yang saw, was in fact the last vestiges of a practice 
that would soon become a cultural relic? Guthrie (1998) severely challenged 
Yang’s description of the role guanxi played and would continue to play in 
Chinese society. Guanxi for Guthrie was on its last legs; what he saw in Yang’s 
work instead were the beginnings of new practices that reflected the 
strengthening of both legal institutions and the market economy. While 
Yang’s interviews did demonstrate that people used guanxi, from his 
perspective it was clear that what they preferred were transactions based on 
market exchanges, rather than sentimental ties weighed heavy with 
obligation. Although special prices deals would be done for friends and new 
customers, how, Guthrie asked, was this any different from what happens 
everywhere else in the world? For Guthrie, then, China was moving 
irrevocably towards an economy that would soon be similar to other market 
economies where rule of law governed business, while supply and demand 
dictated the prices people paid and their ability to access resources.  
 
Guthrie argued that following laws and regulations is becoming de rigueur in 
the face of better and clearer laws and the government’s continued 
crackdown on corruption. Indeed it does appear that these changes are 
having an effect, and that both citizens and officials alike are obeying laws 
more often (Ren, 1997: 2). A clear distinction exists, Guthrie argues, between 
guanxi, which is a network of acquaintances or relationships, and guanxixue 
which involves the manipulation of those relationships for benefit.  
 
 61 
How guanxi affects businesses in today’s China 
 
Most academics have forged a line sitting somewhere between the positions 
staked out by Yang and Guthrie. But the gap between the two does present 
the possibility that China is in the process of creating its own form of 
capitalism; ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ may in fact be a system 
that is distinctive from the combination of market capitalism and a rational-
legal system that has been seen as the key to successful economic 
development as experienced up till now by the world’s developed economies 
(North, 1994). 
 
Rather than merely establishing and enforcing the ‘rules of the market’, the 
Chinese model involves a far more activist role for government. The links that 
exist between local government, state-owned enterprises, and the private 
sector in China has therefore drawn considerable attention. Notable amongst 
these are Oi (1992), Nee (1992), Wank (1996 and 2002), Boisot and Child (1996) 
and Wang (2000).  
 
Oi (1992) established links between local government and private enterprises 
were driving economic development during the early reform era, especially in 
rural areas. Oi described the incentives that existed for officials to promote 
economic growth, but she also noted examples of the discretion that local 
officials had and the benefits that they could confer upon enterprises through 
programmes that ostensibly existed to promote economic growth. Some 
benefits, such as tax holidays for example, were granted beyond the likely 
intent of the national regulations that allowed for them, or extended them 
well beyond what was stipulated by local government (1992: 108). Oi argued 
that these incentives explained why such rapid economic growth was taking 
place despite the lack of property rights that Douglass North had argued was 
necessary for economic actors to make long-term investments. 
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Similar in many ways to Oi, but focused on urban businesses, Nee (1992) saw 
hybrid forms of enterprises emerging as China’s economy made the transition 
from command to market economy, which he labelled ‘marketized 
(redistributive) firm’. These firms had been freed from excessive government 
oversight and control and were thereby better able to respond to market 
signals. However, they were also new firms, short on capital, whose owners 
sought assurance over the rights to their investments. They were able to 
reduce uncertainty by relying upon their close connections with local 
government officials who shielded the firms from competition and assured 
them of regular work. The relationship they formed with local officials also 
provided them with important information on government policy and gave 
their greater certainty over their ownership status of their firms. Conversely, 
firms with such connection could also be penalized as local governments 
became tempted to become involved in the company because the goals of 
local officials could be partially met through the behaviour of these firms. A 
common example cited by Nee is the hiring of staff so local employment goals 
would be  achieved for example. Of course, this made the firms less 
competitive and therefore less profitable (1992: 10-11).  
 
The benefits, however, did not flow only one way. While enterprises 
benefited from the guanxi they held with officialdom, Wank (1996) found that, 
just as Nee had observed, relationships enhanced certainty throughout the 
marketplace by ensuring delivery of resources, creating reliable expectations 
and providing reliable information channels in a market where outcomes 
were less certain, and government decision-making processes oblique. Wank 
found that entrepreneurs in Xiamen where he carried out his research were 
“less orientated towards utility maximizing in price calculations than in 
cultivating the ties with officialdom through which business enhancing 
benefits flow” (821). The relationships that Wank described added to our 
understanding of how guanxi acted as a social institution that gave 
entrepreneurs the confidence to make long-term investments despite the lack 
of property rights in China. As with Oi, Wank saw incentives for career 
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advancement and revenue-increasing opportunities that prompted 
bureaucrats to engage in cooperative behaviour with entrepreneurs rather 
than engaging in rent-seeking behaviour. These relationships were symbiotic 
in nature, which Wank described as patron-client relationships.  
 
Further adding to the picture of the interwoven patterns of behaviour 
between businesses and government, Boisot and Childs (1996) put forward a 
compelling case that China’s economy is a distinctive form of capitalism, 
which they label ‘network capitalism’, in which: 
 
“the system continue[s] to reproduce a model of organization specific to the relations 
between the governmental authorities and the enterprises within their hegemony. The 
authorities concerned are industrial ministries, provincial governments, and (more 
often) local governments. Interorganizational relations between governmental bodies 
and the enterprises in their purview, relations that in other industrial economies 
would be conducted at arm’s length through markets, are managed through personal 
interactions” (605).  
 
This occurred, they argue, because China’s bureaucracy never developed 
significant independence from economic actors, unlike the Soviet Union and 
Eastern-European economies. Chinese officials continued throughout the 
communist period to rely upon personal connections when coordinating the 
command economy (604). The key relationship for most firms is not other 
companies as in a normal market, but rather with local government officials 
(612). This has been facilitated since 1979 by the “steady decentralization of 
economic initiative to provincial, municipal, and even more local tiers of 
government”. Like Oi, Boisot and Childs noted the importance of changes to 
revenue collection, which has reduced the role and capabilities of central 
government while motivating local governments to develop the local 
economy (618).  
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As China’s legal system developed throughout the 1990s, Wank (2002) 
developed his argument, acknowledging Guthrie’s stance that China was 
undergoing fundamental changes from the ‘wild west’ times of the previous 
two decades. Wank agreed that guanxixue was declining in significance as 
China’s market developed, Beijing continued to crackdown on corruption, 
legal institutions became stronger, and laws and regulations became clearer. 
However, guanxi continues to matter, he argued, especially at the local levels 
of government, because of the utility it presents to both entrepreneurs and 
officials: 
 
“…new types of networks are forged as a response to new constraints faced by local 
officials and new monetary resources of entrepreneurs in the emerging market 
economy” (98).  
 
Within these networks “non-standard administrative practices for mutual 
benefit” are being carried out. Wank describes the importance that 
entrepreneurs place on maintaining guanxi with local officials, notably in the 
areas of land use, administrative matters, taxation and licensing and in 
getting new ventures off the ground (102-105). While guanxixue was viewed 
as becoming “dangerous and inefficient”, it was most useful when dealing 
with street-level bureaucrats rather than officials higher up the bureaucratic 
ladder.  
 
Furthermore, more powerful individuals denied using guanxi. Wank argues 
that Guthrie’s belief that this is because of improving implementation of the 
rule of law may be incorrect – these individuals could be achieving the same 
outcomes through other means. Indeed, in follow-up research Wank found 
that those he interviewed were emphasising cooperation between 
government and business, with local government aggressively leading the 
way. This was distinct from the traditional practice of guanxi because it 
emphasised a coordinated government approach involving policies aimed at 
improving economic activity in the local area, rather than individual officials 
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making decisions that benefited individuals and their businesses (107). 
Although personal networks were still important, Wank believed, that guanxi 
was experiencing a shift from being based on personal ties to those based on 
location as the bureaucracy became more professional and there was greater 
scrutiny over officials’ behaviour.  
 
Wank took issue with Guthrie’s perspective on three separate fronts. Firstly, 
Guthrie assumes that improvements in legal behaviour means that guanxi 
practice is decreasing; secondly, he assumes that the policies of the central 
government embody the direction of change; and, thirdly, that he employs a 
reductionist assumption of market economy. By limiting his definition of the 
market to trade transactions, Wank argues that Guthrie does not allow for 
important social transactions to be included (99-101), which is particular 
relevant if ones sees guanxi as being an asset of value which can also be 
traded.  
 
Wank also notes that guanxi appears to have declining utility as a firm gains a 
greater foothold in the Chinese market,  
 
”…guanxi practice might be necessary for entry because the relevant licenses and 
business sites are controlled by local government although its utility is rapidly 
discounted after entry because the trade relations that are forged after entry hinge on 
quality and price” (101). 
 
A lack of traditional connections for foreigners means they must engage in 
‘altercasting’ – the establishment of guanxi between two people who have no 
common connection. The best way to achieve this, they say, is through the 
introduction of reliable third party – a common use of a guanxi network for 
the Chinese themselves (Teung and Tung, 1996: 61-62). Whether breaking into 
a social network of any kind in China is actually possible for Westerners has 
been questioned by some. Interviews conducted by Bjorkman and Kock for 
example found that “virtually all respondents – both Chinese and foreign – 
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were quite sceptical about the possibility of Westerners to really enter Chinese 
social networks” (1995: 530). 
 
Since Guthrie’s response to Yang, the object of study has moved towards how 
guanxi functions and its relationship to the business world. Many, including 
Yang,32 argue that the practice of guanxi has gradually changed from its 
original use of obtaining goods and services on a personal level to gaining 
advantages in business and in areas which give one better opportunities, such 
as obtaining positions in companies or with educational institutes. For the 
instrumentalists, however, guanxi will continue to be sidelined as legitimate 
legal and market arrangements become better able to provide the same 
outcomes that people relied upon guanxi to achieve. If this is true then 
guanxi’s position in society will become less legitimate and more associated 
with corrupt practices.  
 
The Link Between Guanxi and Corruption 
 
No discussion of guanxi is complete without an examination of the negative 
face of guanxi, corruption, as the two are often viewed as being so closely 
connected.33 It is important to firstly place a clear division between corrupt 
practices that are often associated with guanxi and favours that are done out 
of respect or sentimental ties. Corruption, being in no way a purely Chinese 
issue, can have its roots in a number of problems such as inadequate pay for 
civil servants and a lack of transparency. However, personal utilization and 
maximisation of resources at one’s disposal are, after all, easily explained by 
theories about rational economic behaviour. A culture that is permissive of 
corrupt activities and offers civil servants opportunities to engage in corrupt 
behaviour adds another dimension to this problem; after decades of economic 
hardship and the sudden growth in wealth in post-communist China, the 
                                                
32 See Yang’s rebuttal of Guthrie in “The Resilience of Guanxi and its New Deployments: A 
Critique of Some New Guanxi  Scholarship” The China Quarterly 170 2002: 459-476.  
33 See for example A. Millington, M. Eberhardt and B. Wilkinson “Gift Giving, Guanxi and 
Illicit Payments in Buyer-Seller Relations in China: Analysing the Experience of UK 
Companies” Journal of Business Ethics 57 2005: 255-268.  
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ground is certainly fertile. It would be unwise to ignore the problem of 
corruption in China, which is widely acknowledged by even the CPC itself 
and causes many observers of modern-day China to be critical of the current 
‘to get rich is glorious’ ethos of many Chinese today (Chow, 2005: 13). But the 
CPC’s response to the problem seems often to be based more around ensuring 
that the public doesn’t become indignant at the Party rather than determining 
how corruption may be affecting the economy; whether anti-corruption 
campaigns are real and progress beyond the high-profile cases in the media is 
still to be seen.  
 
Wang distinguishes bribery from guanxi in that bribery is purely instrumental 
in its aims, while guanxi involves aspects of renqing (obligation) and mianzi 
(face). Bribery requires no previous ties and has short-term specific aims 
while guanxi is based on long-term relationships and has undefined 
reciprocity – even though the reciprocation is understood by both parties to 
exist. For Wang, the divisions various academics have used to examine guanxi  
(which he describes as expressive, instrumental and a mixture of both) are all 
behaviours that can be placed on the same continuum, guanxi being the 
expressive manifestation while bribery lies at the other end of the continuum 
as the most instrumentalist expression of the behaviour, and a relationship 
that lies between the two - say someone who develops close personal bonds 
with an official, although it was originally undertaken only for the purposes 
of improving business opportunities - being the mixed expression (Wang, 
2000: 536-537). 
 
In her rebuttal of Guthrie’s argument against her, Mayfair Yang looked at blat, 
the Russian ‘economy of favours’ and how that has developed into corrupt 
practices that have damaged the Russian economy. She sees corruption as a 
considerable threat to China because “in the marriage between the 
developmental state with capitalism, a guanxi culture has given rise to 
increased corruption in business-government realms” and argues that the 
study of guanxi should focus on the way that guanxi practices have adapted to 
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the development of a market economy (2002: 465). While her original study 
focused mostly on the lives of ordinary urban Chinese, the corrupt activities 
occurring in China now are more likely to operate at higher levels of business 
and government and thus threaten China’s economy in a similar fashion to 
what has occurred in Russia. 
 
The cultural phenomena of guanxi can both enhance law enforcement and be 
used to avoid compliance. By using guanxi connections companies can reduce 
fines and punishments for severe violations or avoid sanctions completely for 
minor infractions. Authorities may decide to avoid prosecutions when a loss 
of face may result or an individual or firm is known to have very good guanxi 
with persons of influence (Kong, 2001: 1187-1188).  
 
Activities that may well pass as corruption in the West - officials actively 
seeking to create favourable operating environments for firms, for example – 
can also be viewed as economically rational behaviour because of the way 
that tax revenues are gathered in China (Krug, 2000: 17-19). Many firms place 
officials, or those with close ties with them such as members of their families, 
in high-ranking positions; this will often be the official’s only contribution to 
the firm. It is an investment of social capital rather than financial capital, but 
signals to outsiders the firm’s connection to influential government parties.  
 
For both firm and official, cooperative strategies outweigh the risks. For 
officials, on top of the amount of their personal financial reward for being 
part of the firm, revenues generated by a successful firm located in their area 
increase the budget of that official and the authority they work for. Not only 
does their job become easier because of the increased revenue at their 
disposal, but their career prospects improve, as they are judged to a large 
degree on the economic performance of their district and tax revenue. 
Likewise for the firm, access to key officials, their influence and their 
information gives them a significant comparative advantage in the 
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marketplace. These practices are amplified by the decentralisation that has 
occurred in China during the reform period.  
 
The line between corruption and what are merely good business connections 
is hard to define, especially when the amount of corruption that takes place is 
as diverse as that between New Zealand and China.34 For example, when 
accurate information is difficult to come by, is having someone with close 
connections to government corrupt or just a wise investment in information 
acquisition? When officials make the final decisions on whether a firm can 
make an investment in a district, is hiring the offspring of government 
officials corrupt, or a strategic decision to hire those people who you know 
can speak directly with the decision-makers and plead your case?  
 
Interviews conducted by Bjorkman and Kock (1995) found that the common 
perception was that those who developed good relations with a key decision-
maker had a good chance of securing business deals that that person 
controlled. One of the reasons they found for good relationships being so 
important is that trust is integral “to business and information exchange, in 
particular in relations where illegal elements are part of that interaction.” 
Furthermore, in their description of guanxi they note: 
 
“Guanxi entails a strong social obligation to do favours for another 
person, e.g. by providing some kind of scarce resource. There is a strong 
moral obligation to reciprocate favours that have been obtained. The 
resources used for exchange between the persons may include money, 
goods, information, status, and services of different kinds…The trust that 
exists between actors in a social network was seen as particularly 
important concerning transactions which involved illegal elements such 
as ‘extra commissions’ paid to foreign bank accounts or lavish gifts” 
(1995; 526-527).  
                                                
34 New Zealand was ranked first in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions 
Index with a score of 9.4; China ranked 79th with a score of 3.6. 
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Guanxi is often said to be vital to business in China, but foreigners are at a 
disadvantage as they lack the cultural knowledge of how guanxi functions 
and how it is developed. As Wang describes, overseas Chinese have a number 
of advantages over other foreigners when doing business in China - they can 
usually speak at least one Chinese dialectic and they are familiar with the 
norms and practices of mianzi and renqing and how relationships and 
networks are formed within a Chinese society. Another advantage is their 
familiarity and level of comfort with operating in environments that lack 
strong rule of law; they are used to dealing with the uncertainties and 
problems, and have developed a number of tactics for minimizing risk and 
exposure should situations turn unfavourable (2000: 542-543). Westerners on 
the other hand are unlikely to have any of these advantages.  
 
Summary of Part II 
 
This section has attempted to set the context for the realities of the situations 
that New Zealand businesses operating in China find themselves in. The 
interaction between uncertain and ambiguous legal conditions and a far 
greater ‘hands on’ role of the state in business activity underlines why many 
China observers and academics advise that firms seek to develop good guanxi 
with local officials.  
 
China’s legal system has developed tremendously over the last few decades 
as Beijing established a vast number of new laws that have sought to provide 
legal parameters for a market economy. This was most evident in the years 
leading to China’s accession to the WTO, but it continues as Beijing builds the 
legal framework to match its economic ambitions. The enthusiasm for law 
making has, however, not been matched with enforcement of those laws. This 
has created a grey area for all businesses through which they must attempt to 
strike a path between compliance, profitability, and practicality; while most 
business will want certainty around their legal status, businesses must 
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ultimately maintain profitability. Complying with all laws and regulations is 
often difficult because so many bureaus can claim jurisdiction over areas and 
because regulations often clash with each other.  
 
A flexible approach to legal enforcement has allowed Chinese officials to take 
a practical approach throughout the reform period. The benefits of such an 
approach, given the diversity in priorities of across the different cities and 
regions of China, are quite clear. However, as development has occurred, the 
benefits of legal flexibility are decreasing and the problem of corruption has 
become a greater concern for the CPC. While this has seen the legal system 
improve and anti-corruption programmes flourish, the current situation in 
China is still some way from the environment New Zealand firms find at 
home, as can be seen by the difference in international surveys, such as those 
provided by Transparency International or the Heritage Foundation.  
 
The goal of economic development was the central driving force for 
decentralising economic decision-making away from Beijing. This allowed 
local officials with a greater knowledge of local conditions to have a greater 
say in local development projects and, it is claimed, has greatly contributed to 
economic growth. This is disputed by some academics, but few deny that 
collaboration takes place between entrepreneurs and local officials. 
Collaboration is a mutually beneficial arrangement in which entrepreneurs 
gain improved access to resources, capital, and information. Eric Thun’s work 
also demonstrates that in some areas officials choose companies to work 
together in order to develop sectoral capabilities. For officials, career 
advancement is determined in large part based upon the economic 
performance of areas under their supervision, thus giving them a stake in 
driving economic development and helping firms grow.  
 
The vague legal environment and the importance of local government 
officials underline why the relationships that exist between firms and officials 
have been an object of much interest for academics; China has established 
 72 
economic and political arrangements along the so-called ‘East Asian model’35 
in which firms with good government connections have a competitive 
advantage. While it is likely that local firms will be looked upon with greater 
favour by local officials, foreign firms are not excluded from participating in 
collaborative arrangements as long as there is a good case for how the foreign 
firm’s involvement will contribute to local economic development.  
 
Although firms around the world seek to develop relationships with 
government officials and other businesses, guanxi is seen as a unique feature 
of China’s business environment due to the extent of its embeddedness in the 
society. How China’s economic, social and legal development is affecting the 
traditional practice of guanxi has been an object of more recent study. 
Whether the practice is adapting to China’s evolving environment, or 
whether it is fading away as a stronger legal framework develops and the 
market economy becomes more dominant in China, is still a matter of debate.  
 
The FTA between China and New Zealand represents a formalisation of a 
relationship between the two states. Few businesses from New Zealand 
operating in China have the opportunity to interact with officials from the 
highest levels of central government. Many, however, are brought into 
contact with local officials and all have contact with street-level bureaucrats. 
These three levels will be examined in the final section of this study to 
determine whether or not individual New Zealand firms have gained 
increased access to or status with sub-national government officials.  
 
New Zealand officials often refer to the ‘four firsts’36 that New Zealand has 
achieved with China, demonstrating the relationship that exists between the 
two nations. Informal relationships stand in contrast to the formal agreement 
                                                
35 See for example Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan “China, Corporatism and the East Asian 
model’ The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 33: 29-53.  
36 In 1997 New Zealand was the first western country to conclude an agreement with China 
on its accession to the WTO; in 2004 it was the first developed economy to recognise China as 
a market economy and the first to enter into negotiations for an FTA. The signing of the FTA 
in 2008 was the fourth first.  
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between New Zealand and China. While the FTA describes exact changes and 
formats for interactions between New Zealand and China, guanxi is a 
constantly shifting and evolving relationship. While it is easy to find 
references to why guanxi can be wielded so effectively in China, similar 
statements about the power of legal agreement are less easy to find. How the 
FTA affected the relationships between businesses and officials will be 
examined in the Part III of this thesis.  
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PART THREE 
FORMAL RULES AND INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS: 
HOW NEW ZEALAND SMES EXPERIENCED THE 
NZCFTA 
 
 
Interviews in Shanghai and Xiamen revealed three areas of interest amongst 
New Zealand SMEs – at street-level, at the local government level and at the 
border. At the street-level, businesses must deal with local bureaucrats for 
whom the FTA is largely irrelevant. When interacting with local officials, the 
officials’ priorities mean that the FTA, while meaningful because it is a signal 
of the close relationship between New Zealand and China, is less important 
than the objectives which it is their task to achieve and upon which their 
future career progression is determined. The third level, at the border, is 
where the most significant problems have occurred. Importers of New 
Zealand products have struck significant delays and denials of tariff 
reductions.  
 
Positive outcomes are also found. The FTA and subsequent diplomatic 
interactions demonstrate the strength of the relationship between Wellington 
and Beijing. At the local level there are signs that New Zealand companies are 
utilising the higher status that the New Zealand Government has achieved in 
order to expand business opportunities. Broadly speaking, New Zealand 
businesspeople in China are very positive about the value of the FTA and the 
future prospects for New Zealand firms.  
 
Methodology 
 
Part I of this thesis demonstrated that when measured against the trade 
statistics, the tariff rate changes of the FTA do not appear to be the only 
determining factors driving exports from New Zealand to China. While 
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statistics can tell us the end result of business deals made between China and 
New Zealand, they cannot provide any information about how business deals 
were struck in the first place. If anything, given the global economic crises of 
2008/2009, it would not have been surprising to find that trade between New 
Zealand and China dropped. In fact, it increased more than was predicted in 
the pre-FTA economic models that were used as justification for why New 
Zealand and China should sign the FTA.37  
 
In Part II we examined the academic literature on the flexible implementation 
of policy and regulations in China, and on the links between local officials 
and firms and the importance that is placed on maintaining good guanxi with 
local officials. These sources demonstrate that reading the text of the FTA or 
analysing trade statistics is unlikely to reveal all of the complexities that exist 
in the Chinese market today. Interviewing businesspeople engaged in the 
market will provide insights into actual experiences that cannot be found 
through other data sources. At the very least, New Zealand businesspeople 
will be able to tell us more about how the FTA affected their business 
activities and their relationships with representatives of the Chinese state.  
 
In order to learn more about the experiences of New Zealand businesses in 
China, interviews were arranged in Shanghai and Xiamen. Shanghai was 
chosen because of the high number of New Zealanders based there and 
because as a first-tier city, Shanghai is looked to as a model for other Chinese 
cities to emulate as they develop.  Xiamen was chosen because of the links 
that exist through the Wellington-Xiamen sister city relationship, which 
facilitated introductions, particularly important because of the smaller 
number of New Zealanders based there. Xiamen also represented an 
opportunity to examine interactions between foreign businesses and local 
government in a location not as strictly governed as Shanghai is. Xiamen was 
one of the first Special Economic Zones (SEZs) at the forefront of market 
                                                
37 Analysis done in the National Interests Analysis predicted a 39% increase in trade in the 
first year of the FTA; the actual increase was 44%. 
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reforms in the late seventies and early eighties, it has a large amount of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and it has a strong entrepreneurial history 
and a reputation as a place where policies and regulations can be flexible in 
order to facilitate business.38  
 
Information on New Zealand businesses operating in China is not held in any 
central database so interviews were arranged through personal contacts and 
suggestions from my supervisors. Groups such as the New Zealand China 
Trade Association (NZCTA) and Kiwi Expats Abroad (KEA) proved valuable 
sources of suggestions for people to speak with. Suggestions from contacts I 
developed at the Shanghai offices of New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and 
the New Zealand Consul-General also led to some interviews. As the 
interviews took place and the interviewees gained a better understanding of 
the aims of my project, they suggested other New Zealanders they knew who 
they thought could add their insight on certain aspects of my project.  
 
In all 17 interviews were conducted with a total of 21 subjects. 12 interviews 
took place in Shanghai and the remainder in Xiamen. Several of the subjects 
were involved in multiple businesses, making classifying them into separate 
groups difficult. Several were also keen to be as anonymous as possible so 
descriptions here are quite broad in order to satisfy these requests. Of those 
interviewed, 16 were New Zealanders and five Chinese, two of whom had 
previously lived in New Zealand. Originally I had hoped to interview 
Chinese officials as well to obtain their perspectives on the behaviour of New 
Zealanders they dealt with. This proved much more difficult than expected 
and only three interviews took place, one in Shanghai and two in Xiamen. 
These were set up through connections by a staff member at the Consul-
General’s office in Shanghai, a member of the New Zealand China Trade 
Association and one of my supervisors. The interviews took place mostly in 
                                                
38 In 2000 Lai Changxing was detained on suspicion of running and smuggling operation out 
of Xiamen and bribing officials on a large scale, including a former vice-minister of Public 
Security and a senior PLA general. See “Criminal Empire Spread With Help From Friends in 
High Places” South China Morning Post 9 November 2000.  
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English. A full list of participants and descriptions of the nature of their 
business or position is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Composition of Subjects Interviewed 
Description of Subject Shanghai Xiamen 
New Zealander 12 4 
Chinese 3 2 
New Zealanders, length 
of time in China, < 3 
years 
3 1 
3 – 5 years 3 1 
5 - 10 years 4 2 
> 10 years 2 0 
Business Owner 7 2 
Government 4 2 
Sells Goods in China 8 2 
Imports Goods from 
New Zealand 
7 2 
Consultants 3 0 
Hospitality-Related 
Sector 
2 0 
Design/Manufacturing 0 1 
Food / Beverage – Sales 2 1 
Sale of Manufactured 
Products 
2 1 
Retailer 1 0 
Food Production 1 0 
Logistics 1 0 
Factory Operator 0 2 
 
Suggestions from those interviewed in China also led to introductions to 
people living in New Zealand with experience exporting to China and some 
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exporters whom I had previously overlooked. Some of these groups were 
happy to participate in the study, but formal interviews did not take place. 
This was done so that the project could focus exclusively on the experiences 
of New Zealanders living in China since the FTA had commenced and 
because those living in China would be more familiar with the systems they 
had to work with and the cultural context that events occurred within. 
However, conversations both in person and over the phone, as well as emails, 
did enhance my understanding of some issues, particularly in regard to 
border and customs issues. Clarification on issues and official information 
requests were also sought from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and New Zealand Customs.  
 
A template of the interview questions was approved by the Victoria 
University Human Ethics Committee before the interviews took place. Before 
each interview began, the subject was asked to consent to the interview being 
digitally recorded and was given an Interviewee Information Sheet describing 
the purpose of the research and the conditions of their participation, and 
listing how they could contact the researcher or a supervisor in the future. 
Participants were then given an opportunity to ask any questions they had 
about the interview and then asked to sign a Consent Form. Once they had 
signed the form, I informed the participants that a digital recorder had been 
turned on.  
 
The study of informal relationships is a subject area which does not lend itself 
to quantitative data analysis because individual experiences vary so greatly. 
Experiences will also be different depending on sector, location and 
familiarity with China’s bureaucracy and culture. As such, semi-structured 
interviews were chosen as the best format for gathering data. This format was 
chosen because few of the participants worked in similar roles or sectors so a 
set questionnaire would have been unable to cover the range of topics that 
reflected accurately each different subject’s business; for example, many of the 
subjects were involved in importing New Zealand products and so had a lot 
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to say on the topic of Customs, Inspections and Quarantine (CIQ), while 
others were not involved at all in importing.  
 
Although some questions were asked of all participants and the topic was the 
same, each interview took its own course. Three areas were covered 
throughout all of the interviews: the effects subjects had seen arise as a 
consequence of the FTA, guanxi, and their experiences with local government, 
t’hese last two topics reflecting the ongoing debates about the future of guanxi 
as the Chinese state attempts to institute more formal regulation, and the 
extent and effect of local government’s involvement in China’s economic 
growth. Some of the topics discussed were ongoing or needed further 
clarification, so some future correspondence took place via email over the two 
months following the interviews.  
 
As guanxi is seen as being so important for firms operating in China, the focus 
of interviews in Shanghai and Xiamen therefore focused on this area. I sought 
to gain an understanding of how New Zealand businesspeople approach 
developing informal relationships with government officials, what they were 
able to do with the resources that were available to them, and, with 
corruption in mind, what they were comfortable doing. Given the timeframe 
of when my research was taking place, the end of 2009 – just over a year after 
the FTA had come into effect - I was also interested in their experience of the 
implementation of the FTA agreement and how this had affected their 
businesses. Furthermore, because the FTA marked such a significant event in 
relations between New Zealand and China, I also asked whether there had 
been any noticeable improvements in the informal relationships that the 
subjects had with Chinese officials.  
 
Relationships with officials have been broken down to the three levels – 
street-level officials, local government officials, and central government 
officials. This is partly done because of the size of the Chinese state and partly 
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because the size of a business and the level of interaction that it chooses to 
have with the state will partly dictate what levels it interacts with.  
 
All firms will in some way or form interact with street-level officials. This 
term covers representatives of bureaus of the Chinese state which check 
businesses are conforming to the rules which govern them and their 
operations. Their concerns are primarily related only to the area for which 
they are responsible, such as tax, health and safety and employment. Chinese 
customs was included in this group as, although CIQ comes under the 
umbrella of a ministerial administrative group, it has direct involvement with 
businesses in terms of enforcing rules and checking compliance, so more 
neatly fits into this grouping.  
 
Local government officials refers to officials of higher standing and influence 
employed at the municipal or provincial level. These officials will often have 
influence over policy and responsibilities to ensure wider state objectives are 
being met, such as economic development, investment and revenue 
collection. Interaction at this level is thus optional, but many firms, due to 
their size and therefore lack of resources, will not become involved at this 
level.  
 
At the central government level very few New Zealand firms will be involved 
and when they do it often requires the presence of New Zealand government 
representatives. This level is only briefly covered as little information is 
available publicly, due to commercial sensitivity, and because few firms are 
willing to discuss their activities at this level.  
 
Readers should note the limitations of the data gathered through interviews. 
All responses given were self-reported. Though I at no time felt I was being 
given misleading information, the limits of this study mean verifying data 
was not possible. The nature of this topic often crosses into areas of 
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commercial sensitivity and no requests for financial information were asked 
of the participants.  
 
There is a risk, when asked about the effects of the FTA, of participants 
emphasising negative effects over positive ones, or blaming the introduction 
of the FTA for problems that had always existed or whose occurrence was 
unrelated to the introduction of the FTA. Likewise, they may have reported 
positive effects of the FTA, such as the signing of a new client, that they 
perceived to have taken place because of the FTA, when it is possible that the 
FTA was irrelevant to the Chinese party.    
 
However, while self-reported data should be treated with caution, 
businesspeople working in China can offer unique insights that trade data or 
businesspeople not based in China cannot hope to capture. Firstly, as much as 
business is often reported as simple market transactions, social exchanges are 
in many cases equally important. As has been discussed, while this is true in 
general in all cultures, relationships between business partners can be 
especially important in China. 
 
While this thesis hopes to capture the immediate effects that these 
businesspeople saw taking place in the year following the signing of the FTA, 
the limitations of the data gathered should be borne in mind. The hope is 
merely that a greater understanding of the factors that have enabled the 
remarkable growth in New Zealand exports to China of late can be achieved 
than currently exists.   
 
Problems at the border 
 
When asked about the direct effects of the FTA, opinions of those interviewed 
were split between the FTA having no effect, or the effect being negative. Of 
those who felt the effect was negative, most were involved in the importation 
of goods into China. Only one importer felt the effect on his business was 
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neutral, and this person was involved mainly in importing products that were 
not subject to any tariffs, or only to very low ones, before the FTA came into 
effect. Those who were involved in assisting New Zealand businesses in 
China were more likely to think that the effect on business was neutral in 
terms of the direct benefits of the FTA. Only one subject felt the FTA had had 
a positive effect, and this person was a representative of a New Zealand 
agency.  
 
Typical of the responses when asked what effect the FTA had had on their 
business was this: 
 
It’s become harder. I wasn’t here before the FTA was signed, and I 
suspect it was difficult before then…because New Zealand gets special 
treatment under the FTA, [customs] officials are neither familiar with it 
nor particularly happy and this has made it more difficult. They are not 
able to apply the same rules as they did previously. So whether things are 
being deliberately blocked or simply misunderstood is an open question. 
But undoubtedly it has made it much harder.  
 
Importers of New Zealand products were finding that as a consequence of the 
FTA the goods they were importing were being treated differently than 
products from other countries. This had resulted in misunderstandings and 
slow-downs with getting goods through customs. The reactions of the 
interviewees varied considerably based on their expectations before the FTA 
was implemented. Some of the importers had expectations that the FTA 
would bring about a rapid change in costs and procedures. These people were 
largely frustrated at the results. The other group, and these tended to be New 
Zealanders who had spent a longer time working in China than the first 
group, were rather unsurprised and nonchalant; almost as if the FTA was 
likely to cause problems and delays in the immediate implementation period, 
and their expectations had been proven accurate. Their expectations of a 
quick and easy transition to the new FTA regulations have no been doubt 
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moderated by their longer experience of dealing with the Chinese 
bureaucracy. One respondent, who had considerable experience with dealing 
with the Chinese government over previous agreements, said: 
 
I think it’s going to take a long time. It’s probably caught up in China’s 
own development in a way…these agreements don’t really mean a heck of 
lot even when you put them in front of a government agency here. It 
might get you a meeting, it might get people thinking that they should do 
something, but whether it actually results in something, I haven’t any 
seen evidence of that. 
 
Those who had greater China experience, who were taking a more sanguine 
approach to the agreement’s implementation, were, however, noticeably more 
hopeful about the steady progress they felt was being made. The impression 
gained from this group was that expectations of the agreement being 
implemented immediately as per the agreement, or even shortly after it came 
into effect, were unrealistic. Typical of this group’s response was: 
 
It is just going to take time.  The negative effect is that you go nuts 
trying to get it approved and that is why, if it was not substantial, 
myself, I would just bring it in, pay the import duty, pay the VAT, and 
not go through the hassle…. I don’t because, to tell you the truth, I am 
not bringing in so much of the high import customs duty items like food 
and beverage. 
 
These more experienced ‘China hands’ were more accustomed to the length 
of time it can take for a decision made by central government in China to filter 
its way down so that it is taken as actual policy by local officials and street-
level bureaucrats. They were more understanding of the situation that 
Chinese customs officials face, particularly at the Shanghai port, the world’s 
busiest in terms of tonnes of cargo that move through it every year and which 
employs over 25,000 people.  
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However, the core of the problem that was most often raised by the importers 
was not a lack of understanding with the FTA, but rather the remuneration 
system, which they perceived to be motivating Customs, Inspection and 
Quarantine (CIQ, the Chinese customs bureau) to deny New Zealand 
products the tariff reductions due under the FTA. This was true at both the 
institutional level and the personal level. As a group, CIQ is judged by the 
amount of revenue it brings in and is very “revenue focused”, so the FTA’s 
tariff reduction programme affects the group’s performance. Moreover, from 
individual customs inspectors to administrators at higher levels, pay is linked 
to revenue collection. As such, all the staff of CIQ have a personal interest in 
seeing that tariffs are paid on goods whenever possible. The importers felt 
that because they were worried about revenue and remuneration loss, CIQ 
and its officials were not making much of an effort to comply with the FTA.  
 
Others were more pointed in their criticism of the motivations that 
remuneration established for staff at CIQ, saying that in order to maximize 
their own income, staff sought ways to deny the tariff reductions. One 
importer described customs inspectors as now “myopically focusing on the 
detail” in attempts to deny tariff reductions on the goods his firm were 
importing.39 His opinion was that the default position of customs officials 
when they were uncertain about whether a product qualified for the tariff 
preference was to apply the strictest criteria available to them and deny the 
application.40 The other alternative, that they seek more information about the 
product being imported and how the FTA affects the issue, was leading to 
further delays for the importer – a situation causing grief to many importers 
as they are trying to establish a good reputation with their buyers.  Many of 
the importers I spoke to were choosing to pay the normal tariff rates in order 
to get goods across the border expeditiously.  
 
                                                
39 Personal interview, Shanghai, December 2009.  
40 Personal correspondence, March 2010.  
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One unintended consequence of the FTA is that through its very existence, the 
FTA has given the CIQ officials more opportunities to deny the tariff 
reductions that the FTA gives New Zealand products. Because goods entering 
China from New Zealand now require more paperwork than goods not 
entering under an FTA,41 there was more paperwork for CIQ officials to find 
fault with. All of the importers interviewed expressed frustration with the 
amount of paperwork that they now had to fill out, and how unfamiliar with 
the processes customs officials were.  
 
Beforehand an import just needed a few simple documents – a Certificate 
of Origin issued by a NZ chamber of commerce, a bill of lading, an 
invoice and a packing list. NOW, there’s a whole pack of documents, free 
trade zone documents that have to have to be issued, meaning this good is 
subject to the new bilateral agreement between the glorious People’s 
Republic of China and NZ and therefore to apply for the tariff reduction 
you fill out this and this and this and this…right? And this gives ample 
opportunity to customs officials, who don’t really want to give up the tax 
revenue. 
 
As part of the comprehensive FTA, non-tariff barriers were closely examined 
and a number of outcomes agreed to that would facilitate the movement of 
New Zealand goods into China. These include: 
 
- Cooperation between the customs authorities of New Zealand and 
China; 
- An obligation to cooperate so that customs procedures are predictable, 
consistent, transparent and facilitate trade; 
- Customs authorities are obliged to release products with 48 hours of 
arrival; 
- Advanced rulings on tariff classification and ROOs could be sought. 
                                                
41 Pre-FTA, around three pieces of paper work were required by the importers of most goods 
whereas post-FTA this had risen to eight or nine.  
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When seeking advanced rulings on origin, New Zealand exporters could 
request a ruling directly from Chinese customs. Advanced rulings on tariff 
applications, however, could only be made from within China. In practical 
terms this meant that exporters of New Zealand products were unable to 
request an advanced ruling. This could only be done in most circumstances 
by either importers or companies large enough to have a physical presence in 
China (and who had gone through the necessary registered process to become 
an established company).  
 
Problems with the changeover were not entirely unexpected, and steps had 
been taken before the agreement came into effect to mitigate implementation 
problems. An office was established in Shenzhen42 so that importers could 
pay fees in full when the importer disagreed with the decision of the CIQ 
official, but wanted to get their goods through without delay. If this occurs, 
the importer can then apply for a refund of the excess charges through the 
office.  
 
A problem several importers spoke about was that few Chinese customs 
officials were prepared to sign the necessary documents that are required by 
this office. Their belief was that the loss of face that would result from the 
official’s decision being overruled was perceived as too much for the officials. 
What was occurring instead was the transition of goods across the border was 
being slowed down as the officials sought clarification of the rules, thereby 
creating delays. The end result was that few of their goods were processed 
through customs within the 48-hour period established under the FTA.43  
                                                
42 It should be noted that the Shenzhen office was established to handle complaints from all 
importers of foreign products rather than being specifically for importers of New Zealand 
products; they were, however, being referred to this office in the event of a dispute.  
43 Article 57 (Release of Goods) of the FTA states that “Each Party shall adopt or maintain 
procedures which allow goods to be released within 48 hours of arrival…”. Article 25 (Direct 
Consignment) of the FTA stipulates that in order to be award preferential trade treatment 
goods must either be transported directly (Article 25 1.a.) or if transiting through a non-Party 
area they cannot enter the market (Article 25 1.b.i.), and that “the goods do not undergo any 
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Of particular concern to the importers was the problem of goods that had 
been transshipped through a third country. Based on the evidence provided 
by those interviewed, goods shipped directly from New Zealand were being 
allowed through with few problems. However, those being shipped through 
a third country, which is a large proportion of goods due to the expense of 
direct shipping, were being consistently denied tariff reductions. These goods 
were not being accepted because New Zealand Customs did not produce the 
kinds of paperwork required by the Chinese authorities.  
 
One New Zealand importer I spoke with had been unable to get any goods 
through customs with the tariff reductions at any time in the 16 months 
following the FTA’s implementation. The goods he was importing travelled 
by air from New Zealand, through Bangkok, and then on to Shanghai.44 While 
regulations had been established by CIQ for transshipment by sea, this had 
not yet taken place for transshipment by air. Unfortunately for this importer, 
Shanghai CIQ were insisting upon confirmation from Thai customs that the 
shipment had not been interfered with, as stipulated under Article 25.2,45 
which Thai Customs was unwilling to provide. The importer had attempted 
to use documents from the New Zealand producer and Thai Air declaring the 
goods had not been interfered with, but these documents were not being 
accepted.  
 
In Shanghai, delays in goods passing through customs is particularly 
problematic for importers because of the cost of storing goods while they are 
awaiting approval to enter the country. One importer described the 
consequences of the delays he was encountering in getting goods thusly: 
                                                                                                                                      
operation there other than unloading and reloading, repacking, or any operation required to 
keep them in good condition” (Article 25 1.b.ii.).  
44 Transshipping of goods from New Zealand to Shanghai is common because of the high cost 
of direct shipping, so goods are often sent through Thailand, Singapore or Taiwan. 
45 Article 25.2. reads: “Compliance with the provisions set out in paragraph 1(b) shall be 
evidenced by presenting the customs authorities of the importing Party either with customs 
documents of the non-Parties or with any other documents.” 
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What you’ve got to understand is that the one kilometre around the 
airport and around the seaport is possibly the most expensive shipping 
kilometre in the whole chain. So at the moment I spend around 20% of 
my cost structure, including the cost of the goods, in one kilometre. And 
that’s not the duty, it’s the storage costs, and the trucking, and the 
inwards and outwards, and the paperwork. So what in other 
international airports takes two hours, in this city, if there wasn’t an 
FTA, it takes two to three days, and that’s sort of Holy Grail really, if I 
can get two to three days, fantastic, but I’m typically clearing the airport 
in five to six days. 
  
It is likely that CIQ was examining transshipped goods closely because of 
problems with Rules of Origin (ROO) issues they had experienced with 
previous FTAs. A policy analyst at New Zealand Customs informed me that 
they had received a number of queries by CIQ seeking to confirm the 
authenticity of Certificates of Origin as they suspected fraud in a number of 
cases. Close inspection of the paperwork is necessary, apparently, as the 
“noodle soup” of rules covering ROOs across FTAs in Asia had meant that 
misunderstandings were common between businesses and customs and that 
some mendacious businesses sought to take advantage of holes in the 
system.46  
 
The key point here seems to be whether or not one takes a long view of the 
implementation of the FTA. If implementation was expected from the day the 
agreement came into effect, then the reports of those I interviewed reflect a 
failure in the implementation. Alternatively, the agreement could be seen as 
                                                
46 Indeed different ROOs covering trade with different countries will increase administrative 
and compliance costs for firms with multiple export markets, threatening the precise 
problems that Bhagwati warned were possible if preferential trading agreements became the 
dominant form of free trade rather than the WTO format. For a survey of East Asian firms 
and their perceptions of their complicated, so-called “noodle soup” of FTAs, see Kawai, M., 
and G. Wignaraja “The Asian “Noodle Bowl”: Is It Serious for Business?” ADBI Working 
Paper 136 Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2009: 17-22.  
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the beginning of a process, one which over several years the details will be 
steadily implemented and, as part of that process, CIQ will become familiar 
with the new regulations and processes required of them. From this 
perspective, given the size of China’s customs agency and the relatively 
insignificant amount New Zealand products contribute to China’s total 
imports, it is not overly surprising that Chinese customs were not allowing all 
New Zealand products through under the new tariff schedule. This process 
will take some time. An issue of fairness is raised, though, as New Zealand 
Customs had prepared itself for the changeover and had not encountered 
implementation problems.47 
 
Interactions Between New Zealand SMEs and Street-Level Bureaucrats 
 
We came here very early and the officials have come to know me over the 
years as someone who won’t complain, as someone who is quite happy to 
deal with them on the very low level and nothing ever goes any higher 
up. And this again is one of the big myths of China, people saying you 
know you have to have a connection with a higher authority which is 
actually, it’s not just bullshit, it’s actually the opposite of the case. If you 
are doing things correctly, you should never require anything above the 
bottom level. 
 
When it came to businesses dealing with street-level bureaucrats in China, no 
evidence was found that the FTA had made their relationships any easier or 
gained them any distinct advantages. The feedback was mostly that street-
level bureaucrats were if anything uninterested in the FTA and felt that it was 
the concern of higher ranked officials than themselves. To some of those 
interviewed this was no surprise. It was their opinion that attempts to use the 
FTA as a legal document to force an outcome would most likely backfire. 
Rather, and these tended to be the more experienced group voicing this 
                                                
47 A NZ Customs official whose position involved implementing the FTA in New Zealand 
said that no complaints about the FTA had been received by the agency from any Chinese 
firm of official body - Personal interview, May 2010.  
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opinion, differences between a businessperson and a street-level bureaucrat 
should be resolved through well-established guanxi. An important distinction, 
however, was that guanxi was defined strictly in terms of a relationship – not 
as connections with high-ranking officials who could overrule their 
subordinates. There was also clear evidence that New Zealand 
businesspeople steer clear of activities which they see as corrupt as they feel it 
is bad for their business and is likely to cause more problems in the long run 
than the short-term gains that can be gained through it.  
 
In terms of the immediate effect of the FTA in the day-to-day management of 
their companies, few of the firms were seeing any noticeable effect from the 
FTA. There was disagreement over how aware of the agreement street-level 
bureaucrats were. Some felt it was a big event and one that most Chinese they 
knew were conscious of; one even said that when he mentioned he was a 
New Zealander to taxi drivers they would know about the FTA. This stood in 
contrast to another who doubted whether most local officials were aware it 
existed, and would probably only find out from briefing material if they were 
about to meet with a New Zealand official or company.  
 
Given the dominant role that the state plays in China and the greater 
attention that the Chinese, in comparison to other nationalities, place upon 
government relationships with other countries,48 one might have expected to 
see that the relationship between China and a Western country would have 
caused a change in the way that New Zealand firms were being treated by 
street-level bureaucrats in their routine business. However, there was no 
evidence for this. The agreement appears to be held as something at too high 
a level for street-level bureaucrats to be concerned about and they are more 
concerned with the performance indicators that dictate their career progress. 
 
                                                
48 Tianjian Shi, “Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People's Republic of 
China and Taiwan” Comparative Politics 33 (4) 2001): 401-419; Lianjiang Li “Political Trust in 
Rural China” Modern China 30 (2) 2004: 228-258.  
 91 
This is possibly linked in with the strengthening of local regulations and 
enforcement. More precise rules and guidelines, more consistent enforcement 
of those rules, and more pressure on street-level bureaucrats to implement 
them judicially; all these factors add up to part of the shift by local officials 
towards meeting performance criteria for career promotion. In other words, 
what a company or businessperson has to offer the local district is more 
important than where they come from. For a street-level bureaucrat, it is more 
important to be seen to be performing their job properly than to be concerned 
with issues related to China’s diplomatic relations.49  
 
The consistent theme from talking with the New Zealanders was the 
importance of establishing a warm relationship with the street-level 
bureaucrats they had to deal with – be they from the tax office, the 
employment bureau or the health bureau. The emphasis the more China-
experienced businesspeople placed on the conversations was that if annoyed, 
the bureaucrats could cause considerable problems for them. In contrast, 
small problems and infractions could equally easily be overlooked if a 
positive and friendly relationship was maintained.  
 
Interactions between street-level bureaucrats and foreign businesses are the 
sorts of things that can make or break a small to medium business in China. 
Much of the business literature on China advises that both small and large 
businesses need to develop good guanxi with local officials - a patron-client 
relationship, as it is sometimes described (Wank, 1996).50 This not only 
facilitates the processing of paperwork and introductions to important 
people, but also acts as a protection when faced with a corrupt official 
                                                
49 Since 1993, when the civil service examination was reinstated, there is greater emphasis on 
job performance. In 2006 the CCP’s Organization Department issues new guidelines for 
evaluation and clearly stipulated aside from GDP growth, officials would also be judged on a 
number of other economic factors as well as social statistics (worker safety, education, 
welfare), environmental issues and investment in scientific and technological development. 
See  Jarrett and Lie (2209): 37-38.  
50 Also see Neil Abramson and Janet Ai “Canadian Companies Doing Business in China: Key 
Success Factors” Management International Review 39 (1) 1999: 30.  
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attempting to put pressure on a business for personal gain, as this person can 
be appealed to for help.  
 
Several of the companies I spoke with acknowledged that having guanxi was 
important, but found developing this kind of relationship difficult, as well as 
time-consuming and ethically questionable. To solve this dilemma, some had 
made the decision to ‘contract-out’ the establishment of guanxi by hiring firms 
to deal directly with government agencies in their place. This was done by 
hiring firms to meet the paperwork requirements of the customs bureau, the 
tax department, and so on. Such a situation was described by one New 
Zealand this way:  
 
We just don’t have the ability to ‘out guanxi’ other people.  We just don’t 
have the ability.  But, having said that, I acknowledge that it is 
important.  So we do not ignore it either because it is the oil that makes 
the wheels turn in this country. We have the right to go directly to 
customs and clear customs ourselves, but we don’t.  We use a customs 
brokerage company who has good guanxi, who spends the money every 
year to allow customs officials to go down on a trip to Hainan, or 
wherever, who takes them out to dinner and ruins their own liver with 
their baijiu51 drinking and all that stuff.  They do that.  They have that.  
So in this case I am willing to pay them a little bit of money for their 
services. As far as I am concerned they are delivering to me customs 
brokerage services. So we are leveraging their guanxi and I don’t get 
directly involved with customs. 
 
Firms involved in similar practices acknowledged that there was quite 
possibly some questionable activity taking place between the firm they hired 
and those whom they sought to develop good guanxi with, but by staying a 
step removed from the activity they absolved themselves of any actual 
                                                
51 Baijiu (白酒), literally ‘white liquor’ is a common Chinese distilled spirit, general made 
from grains in northern parts of China or rice in the south. It has a high alcohol content and is 
often served at work functions or celebrations.  
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wrong-doing on the basis that they were simply hiring someone else to 
undertake tasks that were too onerous and costly for their own firm to do in-
house.  
 
When dealing directly with street-level bureaucrats, many of those 
interviewed made the point that respecting the authority of street-level 
bureaucrats was very important. What can complicate an issue is the use of 
higher-level connections who are in the position to influence the decisions of 
a lower-level bureaucrat when a serious problem occurs.  
 
Going over the head of the street-level bureaucrats was an action that needed 
careful consideration because of the long-term ramifications it could have. 
While many of the businesspeople I spoke with said that after years of 
working in China they had developed good connections who were well-
placed to help them, they were very reluctant to make use of these 
connections and would only do so in the most serious of situations. A 
preferred method for dealing with the situation was to try and resolve the 
situation with the person concerned. If the situation warranted escalating to a 
higher level, the bureaucrat should be told that this would be done and that a 
higher-level person in the company would also be handling the situation from 
now on. One interviewee explained the problem this way: 
 
They have this expression that if you have a powerful friend he will take 
care of your big problems, but the result is that you’re going to have 
many, many more small problems. Shao yidian dawenti, dor yidian 
xiaode wenti. Because that just pisses off the people at the bottom so 
they’re just going to go come after you for every little thing knowing full 
well that you can’t come running to the big boss over petty matters.   
 
What remains important in such a scenario is saving face for the official and 
respecting the authority implicit in their position. In this scenario, quoting 
laws and regulations, such as those that are provided for in the FTA, could 
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well backfire on foreigners as this would be interpreted as an attempt to 
undermine a bureaucrat’s authority by questioning their knowledge of 
Chinese laws. Such an act also questions their authority by demonstrating 
that a higher authority exists and that the business considers this more 
important.  
 
The story below demonstrates the value in maintaining a good relationship 
with street-level bureaucrats. In this case the outcome was selective 
enforcement of the law by a policeman that enabled the business owner to 
begin operating before the necessary paperwork had been filed with the 
authorities. It describes a situation in which the New Zealand owner of a bar 
and restaurant negotiates with a local police official for licensing 
requirements to be overlooked in order that he could open his operation as 
quickly as possible despite having not fulfilled all the necessary official 
paperwork.  
 
When you’re opening a bar you go through all the series of approvals and 
then when everything is done, in other words you go get a licence, you’ve 
gone through your health bureau, your labour bureau, etc, you’ve got 
everything chopped, the last step is you go down to the police station and 
you ask for their chop and on the policeman’s chop you can then 
commence doing business.  
 
But normally you’ve got your business ready to go before going through 
all the bureaucracy. So for example this third pub I had, we were ready to 
go, it was decorated, I had the staff, the food, we were ready to do 
business. So we did. We just opened and started doing business.  
 
The local policeman, whom we had a good relationship with, came in and, 
he came in at lunchtime and it was all happening and we sat down. All 
around us food was being delivered, drinks were being poured, checks 
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were being paid for…we probably had 150 people in the place eating 
lunch. It was pretty obvious that business was going on.  
 
But the conversation that I had with the officer was, he asked me when 
we would be opening for business and my response was “We will open 
for business when you give us permission to open for business, Officer 
Zhang.” And Officer Zhang said “Fine, you do appreciate that you’re 
not allowed to do business until we tell you you can,” and I said “Oh 
yes, we understand that, Officer Zhang. I always want to abide by the 
laws of China and we will not open for business until you tell us we open 
for business.”  
 
This was the nature of the conversation, and we’re drinking tea and 
smoking cigarettes, we shake hands we go away and everything’s cool. 
And a few weeks later we get our final chop.  
 
The point of all that is that I was respecting his authority. So even 
though I was bullshitting, he knew I was bullshitting and I knew that he 
knew and that makes bullshitting OK as long as everyone knows.  The 
one hundred and fifty people in the bar were kind of irrelevant. To his 
face I was respecting his authority, and that’s how you do things.  
 
If you had sat down with Officer Zhang and when he said when are you 
opening for business and you say “oh, we’ve sort of opened already 
Officer Zhang. I’m so sorry it was a little early,” he will screw you. And 
so there’s a certain subtlety required in dealing with the officials and 
respecting authority is a big, big thing. Really, a big thing. And I think 
that’s one of the difficulties that big companies have, if they try and do it 
black and white they run the risk of not showing the proper respect for 
the officials.  
 
 96 
The person telling this story had spent more than 15 years living in Shanghai 
and as his story demonstrates has come to feel very comfortable operating in 
the local culture. When asked about how street-level bureaucrats had 
changed over the years, he commented that incidents like the one above 
happen less and less often these days. Sometimes when dealing with a 
younger street-level bureaucrat he felt foolish as, trying to establish a good 
relationship, he asked about the bureaucrat’s background and family, only to 
receive replies that related directly to their job.  
 
Several other of the longer-term expats agreed that there may well be a 
change taking place with China’s civil service as older workers retire, 
replaced by younger workers who never experienced the political campaigns 
or shortages of the Mao era that supposedly drove guanxi’s importance within 
Chinese society. Rather, most of these people commented on how these 
younger entrants were increasingly well educated, smart and knowledgeable 
about the outside world.  
 
The businesspeople were uniform in the opinion that there are many 
regulations that by law they were required to comply with, but they found 
that these laws often contradict one another. Often this is because there are 
many authorities competing for influence over an area. With several different 
authorities come different standards so full compliance with all regulations is 
difficult, if not unachievable. When asked to expand upon this point, one 
businessperson gave the example of the fact that he had 43 separate licenses 
for his business. Such a complicated operating environment, especially one in 
which as foreigners the business owners have limited language skills, leaves a 
business exposed to the risk of being found guilty of some violation or having 
to incur extra costs in order to become compliant. Having a good relationship 
with street-level bureaucrats therefore adds a degree of security. 
Alternatively, as described previously, reliance upon knowledge of the law or 
good legal representation was not seen to be a positive way to resolve 
disputes.  
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There was a wide degree of divergence between the New Zealanders I spoke 
with about links between corruption and guanxi. One long time resident in 
China thought that the existence of corruption and the need for connections 
with officials was, and always had been, vastly overblown. Another, again 
with considerable experience, expressed vivid distain for guanxi practices in 
general because guanxi was, he felt, a cover for corrupt activities.  
 
Despite the range of feelings on the link between corruption and guanxi, all 
the New Zealanders I spoke with ruled out use of corruption to influence 
government workers at all levels. Resorting to bribery or similar tactics was 
felt to be a short-term solution to what would become a long-term issue, or, as 
one said, “Guanxi that is based on [bribery] is the worst type of guanxi you can 
have.”52 The impression of both the New Zealanders and the Chinese who I 
spoke with was that the current crackdown on corruption, although certainly 
driven primarily from Beijing, was a genuine attempt to reduce such 
behaviour. Government workers at lower levels were reportedly becoming 
more wary of taking bribes. Some of the businesspeople felt that being 
foreigners insulated them from the problem because they are seen as a risky 
and unknown quantity; the perception being that foreigners are far more 
likely than locals to report corruption either to the authorities or to their 
country’s representatives. They also felt that the size of their companies 
meant that for most officials the possible benefits of corrupt activity did not 
outweigh the risks that exist in the current environment.  
 
It was also considered that the government’s crackdown on corruption was 
genuine and the situation, especially in Shanghai, was changing for the 
better.53 This trend was expected to steadily spread to other areas in the future 
                                                
52 Personal Interview, Shanghai, December 2009.  
53 Many of those I spoke to, while based in Shanghai, were increasing their business activities 
to other cities. They agreed that Shanghai was in many ways different from the rest of the 
country, especially in comparison to the less developed areas in the west of China. However, 
their belief was that local officials across China look to Shanghai in order to gauge the 
direction of policy and its implementation.  
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as well. Furthermore, the government’s policy of rotating bureaucrats meant 
that corruption would only bring short-term gains before a new, quite 
possible incorruptible official replaced them, in which case the firm would 
then have to alter their behaviour so that they complied with government 
standards and regulations anyway. As foreigners, most of the New 
Zealanders also felt that they constituted too much of a risk for the officials to 
attempt corrupt activities.  
 
How the interviewees viewed transparency – whether or not regulations were 
easily accessible, for example – showed a clear difference based on length of 
time spent in China. Those who had been in China longer felt that the 
situation, while not ideal, had vastly improved from earlier years. In 
particular, they said that most information they needed had now been made 
accessible via the Internet so it was now far easier to find out regulations. An 
important caveat, however, was that one needed to know which bureau was 
in charge of monitoring an issue.  
 
In comparison, those who spent less time in China felt very frustrated by the 
lack of easily accessible information, often feeling that rules and regulations 
were sprung on them. The difference in these perceptions probably has more 
to do with experience in finding information in the past and knowing where 
to find it on each occasion; the longer-term residents would also have a wider 
circle of contacts who can point them in the right direction. Greater familiarity 
with the Chinese language seemed to help two of those interviewed in 
particular, whereas most of the new arrivals spoke no Chinese.  
 
At the street-level then it appears the practice of guanxi remain strong in ways 
that reflect the sentimentalist approach purported by the likes of Mayfair 
Yang. The businesspeople emphasised that the existence of a warm 
relationship between themselves and street-level bureaucrats was important 
in allowing them to operate their businesses more freely. When a positive 
relationship existed, small problems could be overlooked, and larger 
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problems could be worked out rather than having fines imposed or their 
business activities curtailed. Hence, sentimentalist relationships are utilised, 
but for instrumentalist gains.  
 
In contrast, at the street-level the idea that Guthrie advocates of increasingly 
legitimate behaviour based upon respect for the rule of law was not 
supported by the opinions of those I interviewed. The focus on the 
importance of having a positive relationship with a street-level bureaucrat so 
that concerns over regulations could be overlooked, red tape avoided and 
expeditious processing of paperwork take place and the like, all indicate that 
guanxi at the street-level still remains important even within developed cities 
such as Shanghai and Xiamen. Such relationships are developed in order to 
avoid legal sanction or restriction of behaviour. Furthermore, when asked 
explicitly whether they would turn to a lawyer if they had a problem, all 
those interviewed suggested that such an avenue should only be ventured 
down if all other options had failed. Legal action indicated that the 
relationship had broken down so far that negotiated solutions, the preferred 
pathway, were futile. Any legal action taken would, they advised, mean that 
future relations would be impossible or, at the very least, extremely difficult.  
 
This affirms an aspect of Wank’s assertion that while Guthrie was right to say 
that while managers’ use of guanxixue is decreasing, this does not necessarily 
indicate they are moving towards increased compliance with the rule of law. 
The businesspeople I spoke with were not curtailing the development of 
guanxi because they saw it as illegitimate or incapable of producing benefits, 
but because the perceived risks of doing so to have increased and because of 
the associated costs in time and money (as well as, in some cases, because of 
the eating and drinking involved, their health). This is supported further by 
their belief that they are insulated from corruption not because it no longer 
occurs, but because foreigners are perceived by street-level bureaucrats as 
being too risky to solicit bribes from. Furthermore, the fact that some of the 
businesspeople hired local businesses because they had good guanxi with 
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street-level bureaucrats indicates they also perceive that benefits arise from 
guanxi, but they wish to avoid that activity firstly because of the risk and 
secondly because of the costs involved in establishing good guanxi.   
 
As is always the case with research on corruption, it is difficult to judge how 
accurate the information the researcher is being given. The reasons that were 
given by the businesspeople for wishing to avoid corruption were remarkably 
consistent across the group, however, and therefore lend credibility to their 
statements. The owners of the smaller firms I spoke to were also hoping to sell 
their businesses at some point on the future, so wanted their books to reflect 
actual assets that could be reported and recorded. Naturally, corrupt activities 
or ‘assets’ could not be recorded on their companies’ balance sheets. 
Corruption, then, was seen as an unwise approach because the short-term 
rewards were outweighed by the potential long-term costs; in other words, it 
just made better business sense in the long-term.  
 
The respondents’ replies regarding corruption indicated a complex 
relationship with the law. Given the strong moral component and concern for 
the long-term fiscal cost that corruption could place upon their businesses, it 
appears as though these businesspeople sought not to deny the legal 
authority of street-level bureaucrats; if anything they wished for a high 
standard of legal behaviour from them. This likely indicates their 
appreciation of the corruption-free environment they know from New 
Zealand and their desire to see that replicated in China, but also their 
appreciation of the Chinese environment which allows them to utilise a good 
relationship to avoid regulations that restrict their actions or impose onerous 
costs upon their businesses.  
 
Benefits at the local level  
 
The next level we examine is the local level where New Zealand and Chinese 
firms interact, and Chinese local government officials become involved, as do 
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representatives of New Zealand – from MFAT, NZTE and the occasional visit 
by mayors via sister city relationships.54 At this level there was evidence of a 
positive effect of the FTA with most respondents thinking that local 
government officials were aware of the agreement and that they saw it in a 
positive light. However, reflecting the literature that documents local officials’ 
focus on economic growth, the importance of performance indicators for local 
officials dominated at this level, so the focus on economic growth at the level 
trumps other considerations, such as those of the FTA.  
 
As was discussed previously, the importance of maintaining good 
relationships with local government officials is often emphasised in the 
literature because of the extent that officials are involved in business dealings. 
This increases with the size of the company and the investment that they are 
making relative to the local economy. The small size of New Zealand 
companies, especially in the context of the Chinese economy, often means 
they are overlooked by local officials in China. Where New Zealand firms do 
have scale and are making investments that compliment local economic 
objectives, support from local officials is present.  
 
While developing a good relationship with officials will progress the 
development of a project, the economic fundamentals of any situation should 
not to be underemphasised. Local government officials reviewing investment 
activity are still focused on attracting investment, GDP growth and 
employment for their area, as these are the main criteria by which their job 
performance is judged. However, it is important to distinguish between the 
different motivations of the different officials who attend investment 
discussions. The objectives of Labour Bureau officials will be different from 
                                                
54 A report in 2008 listed 27 existing sister city relationships between New Zealand and China. 
The relationships varied in their strengths of their relationships, although many cities 
reported being overwhelmed by the size difference. New Zealand’s major cities maintain the 
following relationships: Auckland – Guangzhou, Wellington – Beijing and Xiamen, 
Christchurch – Wuhan and Gansu Province, Hamilton – Wuxi, Dunedin – Shanghai, 
Waitakere City – Ningbo. Roger Matthews et al “Sister City Relationships and Opportunities, 
between Chinese and New Zealand Cities: A paper for the Metro Sector of Local Government 
New Zealand” February, 2006.  
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those of the Environmental Bureau, and different again from those of the 
mayor’s office, the tax office and so on.  
 
Local officials are set GDP and FDI targets by which their performance is 
graded (Huang, 2008: 176). These are set at the central level based upon the 
current Eleventh Five Year Plan, which expires at the end of 2010. The 
economic focus of the plan promotes balanced growth, efficient use of 
resources, maintenance of high levels of employment and improvement of 
environmental conditions in China.55 There are signs that although Beijing is 
attempting to shift focus from the rapid-growth model of previous plans,56 
local officials still focus on high GDP growth, which in the past has been used 
as the major indicator of successful governance (Jarrett and Lie, 2009: 37). 
 
While this shift of emphasis may well be true along the developed coastal 
areas, officials in the less-developed areas of the interior are still focused on 
economic issues. The increasingly competitive nature of doing business in the 
tier one cities57 was a reason given for giving other areas a closer look, partly 
because relationships with local officials and businesspeople were easier to 
form because there are fewer foreign companies competing in these areas and 
so officials were still eager to attract FDI. The opportunities available in these 
areas was highlighted by one consultant I spoke with: 
 
Sometimes you’re better off going somewhere that might be a bit slower, 
but you might get through the relationship thing you might get some 
priority, and that relationship might allow you to get that application at 
the head of a pile rather than buried at the bottom of it. Honestly, some of 
                                                
55 The Eleventh Five-Year Plan saw the introduction of the concepts of “Scientific Approach to 
Development" and "Constructing a Harmonious Socialist Society" as well as greater emphasis 
on social and environmental issues.  
56 The 2007 White Paper on Energy for example includes a section on coordinating energy 
goals while keeping in mind the environment. Key objectives included in the paper are 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions, fighting pollution, lowering vehicle emissions, and 
strict environmental management of energy projects.  
57 Tier one cities are the are major cities of China - Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou; tier two 
cities consist of the likes of Chongqing, Wuhan, Ningbo and Dalian.  
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the fastest experiences I’ve had have been in the provinces, where they 
will drive this for you if you can show them how this is going to work. 
 
Those I spoke to who were involved in investment activities all commented 
that within both Shanghai and Xiamen, polluting factories were now almost 
certainly to be denied approval from local authorities. In Shanghai, regional 
headquarters were now the preferred mode of investment, while in Xiamen 
high-tech, ‘clean’ industries and tourism were the focus, while maintaining 
their traditional strength on logistics and shipping.  
 
Added to this, while in the past local officials were keen for almost any form 
of foreign investment in their jurisdiction, the developed coastal regions were 
becoming now increasingly picky about the types of businesses they were 
willing to allow to become established. In Shanghai, for example, factories, 
particularly pollution-emitting factories, were no longer being approved, as 
the local government’s objective was to become a hub for regional offices.  
 
We’ll often take companies of different sorts to various jurisdictions, not 
just Shanghai and they’ll just say ‘nah, we don’t want that.’ Well what 
do you mean? Is that illegal? ‘No, well under WTO, or FTA or China 
law we’re allowed to have a business of this scope in this district…yes? 
‘No…we don’t want that thanks, we don’t want free trading companies 
in here, we only want these companies.’ And that’s their right, what are 
you going to do? Sue them? That’s their right. So they’re saying we 
want these types of companies and we want this and here’s our 
standards, our registered capital standards are higher, our environmental 
standards are higher or what ever they might be. 
 
Comments such as this highlight positions that local officials find themselves 
in which are difficult to resolve. As Beijing signed the FTA with New 
Zealand, local officials are obliged to implement the agreement. However, 
they are also under an obligation to meet the economic growth objectives set 
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for their department, local district, or province, depending on where their 
responsibilities lie. Where these two interests intersect – say, for example, a 
New Zealand firm wishes to make an investment in a clean energy-producing 
plant, there is no clash and the project is likely to be welcomed and supported 
by local officials. Where there is a clash, and a local industry will likely suffer 
as a result of the competition that the New Zealand firm entering the market 
produces, the investment becomes far more problematic for local officials. My 
field research found that this was indeed the case. Where New Zealand 
companies were investing in projects that were complementary to the 
objectives of the local government, they were finding local government to be 
supportive and helpful. Alternatively, where the project fell outside of the 
development plan local government had for their district, regardless of the 
rules that exist under the FTA the local government was not interested in the 
project.58  
 
In reality, this should come as no surprise. The FTA gives New Zealand 
investors the right to ‘national treatment’ (except in regards to some existing 
measures) and ‘most favoured nation status’ so that no firms from another 
country will gain an investment advantage over a New Zealand firm as China 
signs future agreements.59  As the final say in all significant investments 
belongs to local government (or central government if the investment is large 
enough), even though they may not appreciate it, New Zealand companies 
are receiving equal treatment in comparison to their Chinese counterparts; a 
polluting factory is equally likely to be denied permission in Xiamen whether 
                                                
58 Quantifying New Zealand’s investments in China are difficult because the statistics that are 
kept are subject to confidentiality agreements between companies that supply information 
and New Zealand Statistics. As such, some years the numbers are not publicly released and 
only the code confidential is given by New Zealand Statistics. The following trade states are 
available however and show increasing amounts of investment - New Zealand total 
investment (in NZ$) in China: 2004 - $104M, 2005 - $414M, 2006 - $333M, 2007 – Confidential, 
2008 – Confidential, 2009 - $455M (Source: New Zealand Statistics).  
59 These rules do not include advantages such as the receipt of subsidies or government 
procurement. Government procurement contracts appear to be one of the rising areas of 
conflict between China and its trading partners. As reported in The New York Times, new 
rules in this area gave broad latitude to officials to deny foreign firms the opportunity to bid 
on public works projects. See “Foreign Companies Chafe at China’s Restrictions” New York 
Times 16 May 2010.  
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it is foreign-owned or locally-owned. The practice of screening investments 
however, does raise concerns as to whether local authorities will in time come 
to live up to the FTA and allow New Zealand enterprises a greater latitude in 
their investment decisions. Under the WTO, foreign companies already have 
investment rights, but this has not altered the actions of local authorities 
which allows, in the words of Kong, ample room for “manipulation and 
constitutes a major barrier for foreign investment participation” (Kong, 2001: 
1198). 
 
The larger a company, the greater its need to be in contact with officials at a 
reasonably high level. One representative of a large New Zealand firm made 
sure that he spoke regularly with the executive assistant of a highly ranked 
official in a province in which they had made a significant investment. He 
found this contact useful for relaying important changes that were taking 
place, but would also keep the assistant informed of the activities the firm 
was undertaking, and felt that being open with the official would 
demonstrate the firm’s good intentions and strengthen the relationship. He 
didn’t believe, though, that this relationship would help them gain financial 
support from the official; as a foreign firm he said that they did not expect 
this. But the communication demonstrated respect for the official and he felt 
this would help the firm in the long term, especially as that official gained 
higher office. The company was also considering establishing scholarships for 
local students interested in their field of operation and, possibly, some help 
for government officials to learn more about their operations in New Zealand.  
 
Another businessperson whose company works with New Zealand local 
governments to maximise their sister city relationships said although working 
with the tier one cities was difficult for New Zealand, the scale of difference 
being so great that there was never going to be a lot of benefit for the Chinese 
side to become heavily involved, when it came to dealing with second and 
third-tier cities, the support he received was much more substantial. One city 
he was working with was offering free use of public spaces, free use of LCD 
 106 
screens in the city, and staff to assist with event management. The issue from 
his perspective was that tier one cities like Shanghai have so many of these 
relationships, and are so commercially important, now that they have many 
offers coming in. Approaches by New Zealand groups therefore get lost in the 
crowd. However, smaller cities outside of the main centres, say of three or 
four million people, have ten or fewer sister city relationships and are trying 
to internationalise along the direction that the major cities have already done. 
In these cities, therefore, local officials valued the opportunities that New 
Zealanders offered much more than their peers in the larger cities.  
 
While local state officials are important in China, and the laws and 
regulations that have been passed during the reform era are enforced more 
regularly, neither offer the final word on how most businesses should behave 
on the ground. Good relationships can only take a business so far, and in the 
long-term market fundamentals of price and quality take precedence when 
local officials are deciding how much support to give foreign firms. This idea 
that while having guanxi is good and useful, it cannot compete over the long 
run with a better product and a better price is a point of view supported by 
Guthrie’s research that market forces were increasingly forcing managers to 
behave in ways that maximised returns over guanxi relationships (1998: 279). 
As one New Zealand businessman said in the course of my interviews:  
 
But it doesn’t matter how good your guanxi is if your performance in 
business is sub-standard, the Chinese people will not respect you not 
matter what you do. So I think it is just better to concentrate on being a 
good performer in business. And earning the respect and that little bit of 
guanxi, than trying to just concentrate all on developing these 
relationships. Again I don’t want to under stress, or say that they are not 
important. I just think they might be a little overrated.  
 
Giving further credence to the views of Guthrie, though, were some 
businesspeople who felt that complying with regulations was now sufficient 
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for operating a business in China and that the time when one had to resort to 
homien guanxi (backdoor connections) to resolve issues was passing. Some in 
fact believed that obeying regulations (as far as was practically possible, of 
course), being a responsible and law-abiding business today had benefits in 
itself and was developing a new kind of guanxi in itself with local officials: 
 
…the old gaunxi might be diminishing in value and a new type of 
gaunxi, based on doing your job, doing good business and trying to be a 
good corporate citizen.  
 
The idea that reputation is becoming more important has been raised in other 
works. Wank suggests that new networks are forming as the Chinese 
economy develops: 
 
“These new networks are named in the business community as 
reputation (mingyu) embodying perceptions of status and norms of 
respect, and place (difang), invoking perceptions of locality and values of 
expediency. Inasmuch as they invoke particularistic identities to link 
private firms and local governments in non-standard administrative 
practices for mutual benefit, these networks do not conform to a market 
transition. Instead, they suggest a process of pluralising power in which 
new types of networks are forged as a response to new constraints faced 
by local officials and new monetary resources of entrepreneurs in the 
emerging market economy.” (2002:97-98). 
 
This idea was more commonly held by those who had been in China longer. 
This likely reflects the success in enforcing laws China’s legal system had 
made during their time in China and, that they had learned which regulations 
must be complied with and which could be put aside, thereby encountering 
fewer problems with local officials. In contrast to this, one of the more 
recently arrived New Zealanders I interviewed spoke about the importance of 
building relationships:  
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There’s another thing about China or in fact about commerce here, and 
that is the important factors are quality, price and relationships. I would 
suggest that in New Zealand and Australia it’s in that order: quality, 
price and relationship. Whereas in China I would say it’s relationship, 
price, quality.  
 
This speaker’s words echo that of Yeung and Tung almost verbatim – “guanxi 
is important (perhaps more important) than price and quality” (1996:54). The 
difference in perceptions between businesspeople experienced in China and 
those newer to the environment has been highlighted in several academic 
studies before. These studies indicate the size, type of business and length of 
time to be important factors that contribute to a business’ perception of the 
importance of guanxi.   
 
Yueng and Tung point out that smaller and newer businesses are also more 
likely to advocate that guanxi is highly important (1996: 60). This study 
supports that proposition. Most of the new companies interviewed for this 
study felt guanxi was something they needed to develop. Those who had been 
in China longer spoke of how they did have guanxi, but they were hesitant in 
using it, or they didn’t think it was that important.  
 
The participants in this study suggest that a middle ground exists for 
established firms, as is suggested by the earlier speaker’s proposition that 
quality business performance earns a firm a reputation that is becoming as 
important as traditional views of guanxi. Guanxi should certainly not be 
ignored, however, for as has been put succinctly, “While knowledge of 
cultural differences…will not always guarantee, its absence (ignorance of 
Chinese culture, including the role of guanxi) usually leads to failure” (Yeung 
and Tung, 1996: 60). Guanxi remains an important aspect of doing business in 
China, in part because of the still developing nature of the legal system, but 
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also because guanxi networks are seen as a reliable way of deciding whom a 
business should become involved with. 
 
As Wank argues in response to Guthrie’s critique of Mayfair Yang, 
businesspeople in China may well be moving away from guanxixue, but that 
doesn’t necessarily mean that practices are moving towards standardised 
practices found in the West. If businesspeople are following government 
regulations more closely, is this because market forces are compelling such a 
change, or because they have decided that guanxixue is now too risky or too 
costly?  
 
All of the subjects seemed opposed to corrupt practices primarily on moral 
grounds, while opinions were split on whether guanxi was a cover for 
corruption. They also perceived that officials believed that because they were 
foreigners, attempting to engage in illegitimate activities was too risky for 
officials. However, as a group, the subjects expressed a dislike for corrupt 
practices and believed it unnecessary to engage in corrupt practices. Some 
then went on to suggest that this behaviour was earning them a level of 
respect from officials who had also turned away from corrupt practices and 
who appreciated dealing with a firm who was not attempting to misled them.  
 
The moral objections to corruption that the New Zealanders exhibited may 
well have been transmitted, either overtly or implicitly, to the officials so that 
it was clear to them that illicit behaviour was not welcome. Alternatively, 
given the small size of most of the businesses with whom I spoke, officials 
may have decided that the possible benefits of corruption were too low. Both 
of these possibilities however, demonstrate that risks have increased such that 
petty bribery is no longer a major concern, at least for foreign firms in 
Shanghai and Xiamen.  
 
Many of those I spoke with expressed the sentiment that this was not the case 
in all of China and I was told that if I conducted similar research in smaller 
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cities, particularly in the interior or China, my findings were quite likely to be 
different. Furthermore, it was asserted that sectors that necessitated 
cooperation with central government were where companies had to develop 
guanxi, for example:  
 
If you are in a controlled, sensitive industry like telecommunications for 
example, you WILL HAVE TO go and nurture your guanxi because 
those decisions are all made at central government so they cannot be 
signed off locally. But if you’re in a normal business, say for example the 
lumber and log business, you don’t need to overdo it. 
 
A number of similarities were found with a paper on Australian expats and 
their perceptions of business practices and guanxi. Hutchings and Murray 
found that there was a large difference in perceptions between Australians 
who had been living in China for more than three years compared to those 
more recently arrived. Interestingly, the person in their study who had spent 
the longest time in China, 25 years, had similar feelings about guanxixue as a 
New Zealander who had spent 15 years in Shanghai: 
 
“Guanxi will not decline with globalisation. It never really existed. 
Guanxi is crap – it always was. Everywhere in the world has 
networks/relationships. China is no different – never was, never will be” 
(2002: 86). 
 
Anytime you hear, particularly a Chinese person who says “I have 
connections” it’s bullshit, it’s more trouble than it’s worth. They’re the 
people you avoid, because it’s just not necessary…most foreigners still 
think that it’s handy to have powerful connections and most foreigners 
still think there’s a great deal of corruption that goes on and the simple 
fact is that it is not. 
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In comparison to those subjects who had spent a considerable length of time 
working in China, across my interviews with companies and businesspeople 
who were relatively new to China, their estimates in the importance of 
developing guanxi was much higher. An example of how this refected in their 
behaviour was their appreciation of having New Zealand officials at events or 
travelling with them to government-sponsored events was evident. Having 
officials, such as MFAT officials, representatives of NZTE, or mayors on 
sister-city related trips, accompany them was, they felt, important to develop 
and maintain relationships with their customers. New Zealand officials being 
present at a signing or function between their firm and a client significantly 
raised the importance of the event for the Chinese side, lifting the status of the 
New Zealanders, often quite significantly above what even the New 
Zealanders themselves felt was appropriate for their size. An example given 
of this was a contract signing between a New Zealand firm and a far larger 
Chinese firm. The inclusion of the New Zealand Consul-General on the list of 
invitees saw the president of the firm attend rather than just the vice-
president. Following the signing the Managing Director of the firm felt that he 
was being treated with respect by that firm far more than the size of his 
company would usually have warranted.  
 
Shortly before my research was conducted, a trade delegation had travelled 
with the Consul-General to Ningbo, a city of over two million people that lies 
outside of Shanghai, in order to facilitate introductions between New Zealand 
firms and possible customers. There was broad agreement amongst all those 
who had been on the trip, or who were aware of it, that it had been 
tremendously successful. This was they felt, directly linked to the increased 
profile New Zealand now had because of the FTA.  
 
It appears that particularly in these smaller cities, where there are fewer 
official delegations and less competition amongst foreign firms relative to 
Shanghai, both officials and businesspeople felt considerable opportunity lay. 
One New Zealander described the situation as: 
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For lack of a better term there’s lots of warm fuzzies about. There are. But 
New Zealanders don’t understand China and that’s our problem 
because…and that’s more of an attitude again, because we don’t spend 
the time, or probably have the desire to understand China. Now if we did 
we would quickly understand the fact that New Zealand got that FTA 
means a lot to the Chinese, it means a lot to the Chinese people.   
 
The New Zealand businesspeople were of the belief that the New Zealand 
Counsel-General and NZTE officers in particular had gained prominence 
because of the FTA. The higher visibility they now had had in turn led to 
better access to Chinese officials than would usually be the norm for 
economies of New Zealand’s size, or than they had been able to achieve in the 
past. Particularly for those businesspeople who had well developed 
connections with these offices, the benefits of having officials along at events 
had been greatly enhanced by the FTA. Several businesspeople noted that 
because of the role that local government plays in economic decisions in 
China, the involvement and opinions of government officials are considered 
to be a far more important factor by the Chinese than by their New Zealand 
counterparts.  
 
Indeed the value for New Zealand businesses of NZTE and MFAT acting as 
facilitators of introductions that it was one of the easiest and most beneficial 
ways they could improve their relations with local officials and their Chinese 
customers. For the Chinese, the face to be gained from attending a function 
with high-level representatives of a country with good relationships with 
China was important, as their attendance raised the profile of the event. Of 
course, from the Chinese perspective, that the New Zealand businesspeople 
were able to invite along high-ranking officials also improved the New 
Zealanders’ status. It was felt that because of these meetings and the 
connections made at them between local government officials and 
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businesspeople in China, opportunities would be created for the participating 
New Zealand firms.  
 
Lacking an established set of relationships to facilitate introductions, 
companies that are new to China need to build guanxi in order to break into 
the market. The involvement of MFAT and NZTE staff, as well as sister city 
visits, demonstrates an example of the building of guanxi between New 
Zealand firms, companies and local governments in China, or ‘altercasting’ as 
Yeung and Tung labelled it. This tactic, as reported by many of those 
interviewed for this project appears to be proceeding well.  
 
The example of the New Zealand firm that invited the Consul-General to a 
contract signing, thereby raising the profile of the event so that the president 
of the company attended, is an example of a New Zealand firm adapting 
practices to local culture for their own benefit. People holding high positions 
within government command a lot of respect in China and their involvement 
in any project adds respectability and status to it. Lacking many of the 
traditional relationships that facilitate introductions and business in China, 
working with New Zealand officials appears to be a way that firms can 
establish that respect.  
 
The connections that are being developed between New Zealand firms and 
staff from MFAT, NZTE and local government representatives bear striking 
resemblance to the localistic networks that Wank described developing in 
Xiamen in the nineties. It seems highly probable that having seen the close 
connections between local governments and firms, New Zealand businesses 
and government have replicated a similar system, an example, if you will of 
‘if you can’t beat them, join them.’  
 
Entrants to the Chinese market are known to struggle, as they lack the 
networks that many Chinese businesses utilise. The presence of high-ranking 
New Zealand officials brings status to events hosted by New Zealanders. This 
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in turn increases the likelihood of Chinese officials and businesses being 
present, giving businesses more opportunities to build their own networks 
and develop opportunities.  
 
Confirming previous studies - Tsang or Wank for example - this project has 
identified that guanxi appears to have diminishing returns over time; firms 
that were less than five years old placed greater importance on the 
development of guanxi than well-established firms. If the role of state is as 
important as Huang argues it is, events hosted or attended by New Zealand 
representatives give New Zealand firms the opportunity to develop guanxi 
with people who could offer significant help to firms new to their market. If 
they are able to demonstrate how their business plans can assist the economic 
development plans of government officials this could give them greater 
comparative advantage.  
 
While the guanxi that could be developed through visits from New Zealand 
officials was a consistent theme with both officials and businesspeople that I 
interviewed, many felt that it was an opportunity that New Zealanders not in 
China underestimated and were not making enough of. Relationships with 
local government were seen as very valuable to the firms in China. Those 
with permanent representatives in China thought that other firms who were 
dealing with China, but lacked staff permanently based in China, were 
overlooking the opportunities that these connections created. As one said,  
 
I think the [NZ companies] that are here permanently and have teams on 
the ground are getting good at [dealing with local government officials] 
because they’ve realized it’s a key to success. I think the ones that haven’t 
got full time resources on the ground are just going backwards rapidly 
really; I mean they need to be here to understand to figure out what’s 
important and what’s not important.  
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Several of those interviewed also commented that sister city relationships are 
not valued as highly by New Zealanders as they are by the Chinese and that 
New Zealanders should recognise the opportunities that can come from them.  
 
I don’t think we understand the value in the sister city relationships and 
the leveraging those sister city relationships. You know...the mayor of 
Dunedin has got the right to meet the mayor of Shanghai whenever he 
comes here. You’ve got Christchurch and Wuhan, Waitakere and 
Ningbo. You’ve got a number of these relationships…a bit like the 
FTA…the Chinese take them a lot more seriously than we do.  It’s 
government relationships and they look to government for direction, so if 
the government says deal with Christchurch, they’ll deal with 
Christchurch. They are opening a privileged thoroughfare there that we 
should be racing to get into and engaging and I know a lot of groups that 
are, but again we’re not taking them or using them anywhere near as 
seriously as the Chinese will. 
 
 
A 2008 report from Local Government New Zealand detailed the state of 
many of these relationships and found that the New Zealand cities were 
struggling to deal with the size differences that existed with their Chinese 
peers (Matthews, Murphy, Harris and Beaman, 2006: 8-9). It seems that the 
size comparison creates a perception problem when dealing with interactions 
at this level for New Zealand firms.  
 
Those interviewed in Shanghai were particularly keen on the role that MFAT, 
NZTE and mayors visiting China could play in facilitating introductions. 
While New Zealanders tend to overlook sister city relationships because of 
the low-profile role that mayors and councils play in New Zealand politics, 
the same is not true in China where mayors play a very important role 
because of the decentralisation of the Chinese state. An appointment as mayor 
of a major city is an indicator of a politician who has been selected as a 
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possible candidate for future high-level positions within the CPC.60 One 
businessperson noted that whereas Prime Minster Key was unable to meet the 
Mayor of Shanghai, Han Zheng, through the sister city relationship the Mayor 
of Dunedin, Peter Chin, had met him in October of 2009 and April 2005. This 
was likely to be repeated again as Chin had invited Han to meet his 
delegation at the New Zealand pavilion at Shanghai Expo.61  
 
In comparison the businesspeople in Xiamen, which lacks representation by 
New Zealand government officials, felt that more assistance would be very 
beneficial to them. They felt the relationship they had developed with Xiamen 
city officials was very positive, but, once again, that local officials in Xiamen 
placed more value upon it than their counterparts in Wellington did. 
Wellington is Xiamen’s second-oldest sister city relationship and a strong 
relationship between the local government and the New Zealand community 
there was evident, but did seem to rely on a few key individuals who were 
very active in maintaining the links, while another representative of the New 
Zealand China Trade Association was active in promoting Xiamen in 
Wellington. One of the New Zealand businesspeople in Xiamen had been 
attempting for several years to get a New Zealand carving erected in a 
Xiamen city park that celebrated its relationships with other cities around the 
world. However, the Wellington City Council had been reluctant to offer 
financial support to the project.62  
 
As previously discussed, though, while positive relations developed with 
local government were seen as helpful, at the end of the day decisions made 
by local government are only part of the equation. The unknown quantity in 
these issues is the degree to which the Chinese company that a New Zealand 
                                                
60 Jiang Zemin was Mayor of Shanghai and Vice-Premier (and likely successor to Wen Jiabao) 
Wang Qishan was Mayor of Beijing. Three of the nine members of the current Politburo 
Standing Committee of the CCP have held mayoral positions in the past Jia Qinglin - Beijing, 
Li Changchun - Shenyang, and Zhou Yongkang – Panjin.  
61 “Otago to have presence at World Expo” Otago Daily Times 13 May 2010. The two mayors 
also meet each other in April, 2005.   
62 Personal Correspondence, May 2010. 
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firm is dealing with interacts with local government officials, and whose 
opinion takes precedent and to what degree. One consultant’s opinion was 
that while the FTA greatly enhanced the prestige of New Zealand and New 
Zealanders in the eyes of officials, he felt that the prestige an official would 
gain by having a US firm set up in their jurisdiction would still outweigh that 
of a New Zealand company. Again, this was a problem related to the small 
size of most New Zealand firms, as the scale of most American firms and the 
potential benefits to the local district would likely far outweigh those that 
most New Zealand enterprises would offer.  
 
Another reason given for making sure a good relationship with local officials 
existed was because so many changes are occurring in the regulatory 
environment in China. These changes affected negotiated agreements with 
local government or with business partners. This inevitably leads to either 
conditions having to be renegotiated or a compromise having to be 
established. In this situation a strong and healthy relationship between the 
parties was most likely to be able to accommodate everyone’s goals within the 
new reality.  
 
Engaging with local officials and maintaining good relationships is positive 
for companies in three ways. It opens up the opportunity for favourable 
interpretations of legislation. This does not mean engaging in activities that 
could be construed as illegal, but acknowledges that in China laws and 
regulations are written to allow flexible implementation by local authorities, 
as has traditionally been the case, especially since the reform era began, so 
that maximum economic gains can be made. Moreover, by taking into 
account local objectives and working with government it is less likely that 
laws will be interpreted so as to adversely affect a company. Good guanxi 
with local officials also broadens a firm’s network, meaning that a firm can be 
introduced to more opportunities that exist in the area.   
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The positive reaction of those interviewed could be attributed in part to the 
fact that as a group, New Zealanders in China are on the receiving end of the 
benefits of the FTA but suffering few of the costs. The costs of an FTA, such as 
increased domestic competition and cheaper imported goods that can 
threaten native business, do not affect this group. Kawai and Wignaraja for 
example, found that firms perceived that the greatest gains from preferential 
trading agreements came from increased market access and preferential tariffs 
(2009: 16), something that those interviewed are well positioned to gain from 
because their businesses are based in China. Furthermore, they also suggest 
that firms overweight the perceived benefits but undervalue the real costs, 
while larger firms have more complaints than smaller firms (2009: 16-18). 
 
The strength of relationships between the governments of New Zealand and China 
 
The most positive effect of the FTA was articulated by those I interviewed 
when discussion moved to the effects of the FTA on the relationship between 
the governments of New Zealand and China. All those interviewed were 
extremely positive about the position that the New Zealand Government had 
established for itself, except one, who felt that now the FTA discussions had 
been concluded there would be less opportunity for engagement between the 
governments of the two countries: 
 
When we were negotiating the FTA it gave us a reason for Chinese 
officials to meet with us because we were in the process of doing this 
thing. Now that the thing has been completed, it’s kind of past history 
effectively. We always knew there would be a one or maybe two year 
time frame when New Zealand would have a very positive feeling in 
the mind of Chinese officials in that this was an opportunity to really 
push things. Now that the agreement has been done and dusted, I 
guess our special thing that we provide is maybe not there anymore.  
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This point of view was seemingly being refuted though by the efforts of New 
Zealand representatives who were using the FTA as a reason to increase 
contacts with officials in areas outside of the tier one cities that had not yet 
been the focus of much attention. Trade delegations visited three cities in the 
last six months of 2009, following on the heels of Prime Minister John Key’s 
visit to China in April of the same year, which also included a number of 
representatives from New Zealand’s business community. New Zealand 
officials were also keen to continue to maintain the high profile the country 
had received following the FTA, with a large presence in the Shanghai Expo 
in 2010 and also large campaigns promoting New Zealand as a tourism 
destination in Shanghai and Beijing.  
 
The two-year time frame for New Zealand to benefit from the FTA was based 
largely on the belief that Australia or a similar-sized developed economy 
would quickly follow New Zealand in procuring a trade deal with China. 
However, by the time my field research was taking place, in the wake of the 
Rio Tinto scandal, this was no longer the case. Those who claimed to have 
reasonably good connections to officials seemed very sceptical that larger 
developed economies would be inking an FTA anytime soon with China: 
 
The Chinese put a meat ban on America about six years or more and 
from the people I speak to there’s not a sign on anyone’s horizon that it’s 
going to change in anytime that anyone can think of. I don’t know what’s 
going on behind the scenes, but that’s a major political issue and it’s not 
going to go away. And when there’s no real justification for it in China 
that means there’s another reason for it which is a lot stronger. Like the 
Aussies, the Aussies are not going to get an FTA for as long as I’m going 
to be here, and I don’t know how long that’s going to be so…first they 
said they were going to be first and then they were going to be right after 
us, look at the politics that’s going on with the fall out of Rio Tinto.”   
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Indeed, it increasingly appears that relations between Beijing and Wellington, 
rather than having peaked with the FTA, are continuing to develop. There has 
been a notable focus on China since the Key Government took over the 
Treasury benches in Wellington. A strengthening relationship between the 
two states at the official level has been demonstrated a number of times since 
the FTA was signed. New Zealand’s Prime Minster, John Key, made China 
one of his first official visits, meeting both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. He has 
travelled twice more to China, including a visit to the Shanghai Expo in 2010. 
Five other high-level ministerial delegations were scheduled to visit the Expo 
as well (Groser, 2010). 
 
One of the clearest signs of the strengthening relationship occurred in May 
2010 when New Zealand’s Trade Minister and Minister responsible for 
Climate Change Negotiations, Tim Groser, was invited by Premier Wen to 
talks with India, Indonesia, South Africa and Brazil on climate change. New 
Zealand was the only developed nation present at the talks between the large 
developing nations, whose size made New Zealand’s inclusion all the more 
apparent. This indicates the unique nature of New Zealand’s relationship 
with China, especially when compared to other Western states.63 New 
Zealand also reportedly received support from Vice-Premier Xi Jinping 
during his June 2010 visit to New Zealand for its bid to gain a seat on the 
United Nations Security Council in 2015.64 Another sign is the prominent 
position that was given to New Zealand in the headline event for 2010 in 
China, the Shanghai World Expo.  
 
As the first developed economy to sign an FTA with China, New Zealand 
appears to have firmly established itself as a ‘friend of China’, one that stands 
in a unique position, especially in comparison to other western nations. This 
view was reflected particularly by one Chinese official I interviewed:  
 
                                                
63 “NZ minister defends China's climate change image” Radio New Zealand News 9 May 
2010. 
64 Fran O’Sullivan “China Ready to back NZ’s UN bid” New Zealand Herald 19 June 2010.  
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Why do you think that New Zealand was chosen by China as the first 
country to sign an FTA with? The most important reason is that New 
Zealand is regarded as the most-friendly country for China. The second 
reason is that New Zealand and China have no economic or trade 
conflicts, we have no conflicts. What we have are joint interests. No 
conflicts of interest, no arguments over trade, and here in China, not just 
in Shanghai, New Zealanders are regarded as the most peace-loving and 
friendly people in the world.  
 
In other words, the New Zealand government has done very well out of the 
FTA process and is now viewed very favourably by the Chinese government 
and its people. There seemed little doubt amongst those interviewed that the 
signing of the FTA had raised considerably New Zealand’s profile amongst 
the Chinese. One long-term Chinese businessperson felt that knowledge of 
the FTA was common amongst a wide range of people, and that the FTA 
signalled to the Chinese people that their government had extended a hand of 
friendship to New Zealand and, therefore, they in turn should treat New 
Zealanders more favourably because of this. That the FTA is well known 
seems unlikely, however, as, when asked a similar question about knowledge 
of the FTA amongst customs officials, the expectation was that it was unlikely 
that they were very familiar with the agreement or even its very existence, let 
alone the details.  
 
It appears likely indeed that the FTA has greater symbolic value to the 
Chinese Government than it does to New Zealand. That New Zealand was 
the first developed economy that China choose to sign an FTA with 
demonstrates a strong relationship for the Chinese,65 whereas for most New 
                                                
65 Indeed the Chinese have long held New Zealand in a favourable light, which can partly be 
traced back to the work of Rewi Alley. Alley was one of the few foreigners allowed to remain 
in China following the CPC’s victory against the KMT in 1949 based upon his service during 
the civil war and his work in education and assistance in setting up the Gung Ho (工合) 
cooperatives.  
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Zealanders, including government officials in New Zealand, China’s 
importance still seems to be discussed almost entirely in economic terms.66  
 
Western perspectives of what a signed document means can vary 
considerably from the Chinese perspective. For the Chinese, an agreement is 
often seen as a symbolic act that signals the evolution of a relationship, but is 
not viewed as binding and can be renegotiated at any time (Cunningham, 
2005; MacKenzie, 2005). One interviewee directly raised the possibility that 
New Zealand and China probably had different interpretations of what it was 
that the agreement meant. China’s other FTAs, he argued, were a measure of 
the relationship that existed between the countries, citing ASEAN as an 
example.67  
 
Conversely, New Zealand’s main trading agreement is CER with Australia, a 
country with which it has strong, multifaceted ties and where the largest 
number of New Zealanders can be found living outside of New Zealand. The 
economic benefits that flow from the trading relationship between Australia 
and New Zealand are the focus of CER, while the strength of the relationship 
is measured in other areas like the countries’ shared histories, geographic 
location and similar cultures.  
 
So far only two events have placed any strain on the relationship between 
China and New Zealand. The first of these was the melamine scandal, centred 
on the San Lu Group (三鹿集团), which New Zealand’s largest company, 
Fonterra, had a forty percent share of.68 New Zealand and Fonterra remained 
relatively unaffected by the scandal however, as most of the blame was 
directed towards the Chinese executives of San Lu. This possibly reflected the 
fact that it was from New Zealand that Beijing first learned of the issue. 
                                                
66 As discussed earlier in the section detailing expectations from FTAs, announcements by the 
likes of Prime Minister Helen Clark and Trade Minister Phil Goff described the benefits to 
New Zealand almost exclusively in economic terms.  
67 Personal Interview, Shanghai, December 2009.  
68 For more on the melamine scandal and its effect on Fonterra, see Fran O’Sullivan “So long, 
Sanlu” New Zealand Herald, 2 May 2009. 
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Following the scandal, New Zealand Prime Minister John Key visited Beijing 
on a tour. During an official dinner he took Fonterra’s Chairman, Henry van 
der Hayden, to the head table to discuss their problems with Premier Wen. 
The outcome of this discussion was that New Zealand undertook to assist 
China with advice on food safety issues, an offer warmly received by the 
Chinese.69 The second event was far more minor, but involved a protesting 
New Zealand MP scuffling with a Chinese security team as China’s Vice-
President Xi Jinping visited the Beehive. Interestingly, this incident was not 
reported in the Chinese media, except in the English China Daily, reflecting 
perhaps China’s desire to play the incident down.  
 
                                                
69 In comparison the problems related to mining giant Rio Tinto reflected far more poorly on 
Australia. It was rumoured that the arrests were a response to the refusals of Rio Tinto to 
allow Chinalco to increase its stake in Rio Tinto. For the Rio Tinto bribery case, see “Rio 
Tinto’s Stern Hu jailed for 10 years” The Australian 29 March 2010.  
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Conclusions 
 
Since Douglas Guthrie wrote his response to Mayfair Yang’s Gifts, Favours and 
Banquets, much debate over the development of guanxi and its role in China’s 
developing economy has taken place. Much in China has also changed. The 
growth in China’s economy has brought it into the global economic system 
and membership in the WTO necessitated substantial changes to laws 
pertaining to its economy and foreign investment. As China’s development 
continues it is likely that it will integrate further and sign trading agreements 
with other developed economies as it has with New Zealand. 
 
In Part I we examined the New Zealand-China FTA and its effects on New 
Zealand’s exports to China. When it was signed, many praised New Zealand 
negotiators for having secured a deal that offered New Zealand a number of 
wins. Even in the middle of one of the most troublesome times in the global 
economy for decades, New Zealand’s exports to China during the first year of 
the agreement exceeded the predicted 39% increase, increasing 44%. The 
current literature on FTAs has focused on the static gains that arise from the 
removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. More recently, the economic 
literature has sought to explain how dynamic gains contribute to the long-
term benefits of preferential trading arrangements. This study has identified 
that the growth in exports cannot be solely attributed to static gains, while it 
is too soon for dynamic gains to have been realised.  
 
Part II of this thesis demonstrated how political, legal and cultural conditions 
in China are markedly different from New Zealand. Laws and regulations are 
often not as black and white as they are in New Zealand and local officials 
often act at cross-purposes to their superiors in Beijing. Street-level 
bureaucrats also wield significant discretionary powers that can both help 
and hinder firms. Due to the move away from a command economy, 
decentralisation of economic decision-making has meant that local 
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government officials have responsibility for most decisions that affect SMEs. 
Their positions also mean that they are capable of making connections 
between businesses that foster economic activity. These differences make the 
informal relationships individuals and businesses develop more important 
because warm relationships with local officials and street-level bureaucrats 
can assist firms to broaden their opportunities and ease bureaucratic burdens.  
 
This thesis has sought to determine whether the strength of the relationship 
that exists between China and New Zealand has had benefits for New 
Zealand SMEs operating in China. The FTA has certainly helped Wellington 
strengthen its relationship with Beijing; on all fronts; things have never been 
better between the two countries. But as Part II demonstrated, there are 
situations where there is a wide gulf between the promises Beijing aspires to 
deliver and the objectives of sub-national governments and officials.  
 
Part III of this thesis revealed the findings of interviews with businesspeople 
and officials currently operating in China. The research shows that when 
dealing with street-level bureaucrats, there is no sign that the FTA has had 
much impact on relations. However, as firms engage with officials at higher 
levels the influence of the FTA becomes more pronounced. It is at these 
higher levels that collaboration between New Zealand government 
representatives and businesses appears to be paying off the most, and 
perhaps it is at this level, a level that economic models offer little insight on, 
that some of the unpredicted gains by New Zealand exporters are perhaps 
being achieved.  
 
The subjects of this study reported problems getting their products through 
customs; rather than improving customs procedures, it appears that the FTA’s 
early implementation period proved troublesome for importers of New 
Zealand products. The subjects suggested that this was due to CIQ as a 
department being revenue-orientated and the remunerated of its staff being 
based upon revenue collection; these motivations have stood in the way of 
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New Zealand goods receiving the treatment accorded under the FTA. 
Problems with documentation have also caused delays in goods getting 
across the border as customs officials sought opportunities to impose tariffs.  
 
The FTA has had no discernable effect when dealing with street-level 
bureaucrats. Moreover, attempts to use the FTA when there was 
disagreement over laws or regulations could well backfire on the company. 
When dealing with street-level bureaucrats the subjects instead emphasised 
the need to respect the authority of the person they were dealing with and 
cultivate a warm and friendly relationship. While this approach has much in 
common with the development of guanxi, the subjects accentuate the 
relationship aspect of guanxi, rather than instrumentalist aspects more 
associated with guanxixue.  
 
Although street-level bureaucrats are seldom in a position to help a business, 
their capacity to create problems is quite large. One of the interesting findings 
from this study was how the subjects believed that by doing their best to 
comply with local regulations and having a helpful approach with street-level 
bureaucrats, they were develop a new bond or status based upon their 
reputation. Reputation (mingyu) implies being a company that is not 
obstructive, complies as much as possible with a bureau’s rules and seeks to 
be, shall we say, a ‘good corporate citizen’.  
 
By seeking to develop a good reputation firms made the street-level 
bureaucrat’s work much simpler. In the past dealings with street-level 
bureaucrats were often problematic and marked with the imposition of small 
fines or charges. Problems may have been resolved with small bribes or 
perhaps dinners. This change in approach may signal that the crackdown on 
corrupt activities over the last decade may be having an effect. At the very 
least, it has made street-level officials wary of the risks corruption poses to 
their position and they may be calculating that attempting to do so with small 
foreign companies is not worth the risk. Such behaviour demonstrates that 
 127 
Guthrie’s prediction that individuals would use guanxi less as China’s 
economic and legal institutions strengthened may be correct. However, in line 
with Wank’s (2002) criticism, it does not demonstrate that firms are moving 
towards using these institutions, only that they are moving away from guanxi 
because street-level bureaucrats perceive the risk to be too great while firms 
may believe that the costs in time and resources of guanxi do not offer 
certainty of returns. Businesspeople seeking to enhance their reputation 
represents a change in informal behaviour, rather than a strengthening of 
formal institutions.  
 
At the local government level guanxi still appears to be significant and it is at 
this level where subjects provided the most positive feedback in regards to 
the effect of the FTA. Having the opportunity to meet with and develop 
guanxi with local officials was highly valued because firms believed it assisted 
them to meet potential clients and develop their presence in the market. The 
NZCFTA has assisted New Zealand government representatives to assist 
firms by lifting their status within China, thereby allowing them to meet with 
more Chinese officials. Even though these visits do not offer the same 
financial returns as great as larger firms from larger countries, they do entice 
Chinese officials to meet with New Zealand’s representatives who visit China 
or are based in China because of their high status. New Zealand firms too 
appear to be benefiting as well through their involvement with trade 
delegations. 
 
The interview subjects also responded favourably when asked about trade 
missions. Unfortunately there is scant information compiled on the outcomes 
of the various trade missions that take place via sister city relationships, while 
NZTE has only just recently begun to examine the commercial benefits that 
have resulted from its various efforts to boost trade with China. Most of the 
information that has been collected cannot be released because of its 
commercially sensitive nature. What information is publicly available 
indicates this may in fact be the case. An annual fair held in Shanghai for New 
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Zealand food and beverage companies, for example, saw the number of 
companies more than double, despite far stricter standards for the companies 
wishing to be involved.70 
 
Interviews with New Zealanders in China revealed that despite the issues 
over tariffs and access, the FTA was very popular. Almost all of the Kiwis 
spoke of the benefits that the FTA had brought to in terms of relationships 
with the Chinese. Further study of this is required to determine whether 
relationships are really capable of bringing such large benefits to firms from a 
country that has recently signed an FTA. While New Zealand’s progress on 
signing FTAs with other states seems set to continue, it is possible that China 
is a unique case, given the involvement of the state in guiding economic 
development and the embededness of guanxi. As such, comparisons to other 
developed economies signing FTAs with China may provide more insights.  
 
At the local level, officials are focused on reaching local objectives of 
economic growth, employment and development. At this level officials can 
see advantages of working with a foreign company that can assist them to 
meet their goals. A problem for many New Zealand firms has been breaking 
into the Chinese market, so it is notable both that it was the firms that were 
newer to China who felt that guanxi was more important, and that these same 
firms expressed the most enthusiasm for how the FTA was helping them 
extend their contacts with local government officials.  
 
The small size and composition of the group studied limits the ability to draw 
conclusions about what is happening with far larger companies who sell 
significant quantities of goods that constitute a far larger percentage of New 
Zealand goods than those who were interviewed for this study. Most of these 
companies are reluctant to share much about their China operations so it is 
very difficult to obtain either figures about their commercial activities or their 
opinions and experiences. It is quite possible that these larger companies are 
                                                
70 Personal correspondence, June 2010.  
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not having the same difficulties as the smaller companies interviewed for this 
study. If and when they encounter difficulties, it is likely that they have the 
resources and connections to have problems solved quickly. If this is the case, 
they would be receiving the benefits of lower tariffs and better access. It is 
also likely that they are receiving the benefits that this study has highlighted.  
 
These issues should be considered and further examined as New Zealand 
signs future trade deals with other countries. The recently signed FTA with 
Malaysia, the Closer Economic Partnership with Hong Kong, and the 
likelihood of an agreement soon being reached with India offer such 
opportunities. Although these states have their own distinct cultural and 
political traditions, they offer the chance to once again examine the behaviour 
of New Zealand firms, the economic effects of an FTA and the changes to the 
relationships between government officials and businesspeople based 
overseas.  
 
Beyond the trade benefits, the FTA represents an investment by the New 
Zealand government in social capital with the Chinese government, one that 
appears to be paying dividends. The Key Government has already achieved a 
number of small diplomatic successes and despite initial fears that New 
Zealand would fall out of the spotlight after the FTA was completed, has 
managed to maintain a high level of interaction with Chinese officials. 
Turning these events into long-term gains is possible given the positive light 
that New Zealand is now seen in China.  
 
To capitalise on the FTA with China, to transition from the guanxi that was 
established through the FTA, New Zealand firms and government officials 
need to move to the next stage – guanxixue, or to la guanxi. To do this, the 
government and enterprises should utilise a different approach than the one 
they use in their traditional markets. Such a model needs to acknowledge the 
role that the Chinese state plays in the economy and use the strength of 
existing informal relationships to create a comparative advantage for New 
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Zealand firms, as it appears that benefits that can be achieved thereby may 
well be not fully appreciated or understood by traditional models that have 
sought to judge the value of preferential trading agreements up to now. This 
study has revealed that this appears to already be occurring in the locations 
studied.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: 
 
HS Codes and products for all products exported to New Zealand in 2009 valued 
more than NZ$ 10M.  
 
No Change in Tariff at Implementation of FTA: 
 
2601.11 Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated 
2709.00 Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude 
4403.20 Wood; coniferous, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, 
or roughly squared, untreated 
4407.10 Wood, coniferous; sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or 
not planed, sanded or end-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm 
4411.12 Medium density fibreboard (MDF), of a thickness not exceeding 5 mm 
4411.14 Medium density fibreboard (MDF), of a thickness exceeding 9 mm 
4703.21 Wood pulp; chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate, (other than dissolving 
grades), semi-bleached or bleached, of coniferous wood 
4705.00 Wood pulp; obtained by a combination of mechanical and chemical pulping 
processes 
4804.11 Kraft paper and paperboard; kraftliner, uncoated, unbleached, in rolls or 
sheets, other than that of heading no. 4802 or 4803 
4810.92 Paper and paperboard; multi-ply, coated with kaolin or other inorganic 
substances only, for non-graphic purposes, n.e.c. in heading no. 4810, in rolls 
or sheets 
5101.11 Wool; (not carded or combed), greasy (including fleece-washed wool), shorn 
5101.21 Wool; (not carded or combed), degreased, (not carbonised), shorn 
8541.60 Crystals; mounted piezo-electric 
9809.00 Confidential items (excluded from table) 
 
Low Change in Tariff at Implementation of FTA: 
 
0202.30 Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, frozen 
0204.42 Meat; of sheep (including lamb), cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and 
half-carcasses), frozen 
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0402.10 Dairy produce; milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar or 
other sweetening matter, in powder, granules or other solid forms, of a fat 
content not exceeding 1.5% (by weight) 
0402.21 Dairy produce; milk and cream, concentrated, not containing added sugar or 
other sweetening matter, in powder, granules or other solid forms, of a fat 
content exceeding 1.5% (by weight) 
0402.29 Dairy produce; milk and cream, containing added sugar or other sweetening 
matter, in powder, granules or other solid forms, of a fat content exceeding 
1.5% (by weight) 
0404.10 Dairy produce; whey, whether or not concentrated or containing added 
sugar or other sweetening matter 
0405.10 Dairy produce; derived from milk, butter 
0405.90 Dairy produce; fats and oils derived from milk (other than butter or dairy 
spreads) 
0406.10 Dairy produce; fresh cheese (including whey cheese), not fermented, and 
curd 
0406.20 Dairy produce; cheese of all kinds, grated or powdered 
4102.10 Skins; raw, of sheep or lambs, fresh, or salted, dried, limed, pickled or 
otherwise preserved, (but not tanned, parchment-dressed or further 
prepared), with wool on 
 
 
Medium Change in Tariff at Implementation of FTA: 
 
0303.79 Fish; frozen, n.e.c. in heading no. 0303 (excluding fillets, livers, roes and 
other fish meat of heading no. 0304) 
0401.30 Dairy produce; milk and cream, not concentrated, not containing added 
sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content exceeding 6% (by weight) 
1901.90 Food preparations; of flour, meal, starch, malt extract or milk products, for 
uses n.e.c. in heading no. 1901 
2301.20 Flours, meals and pellets; of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic 
invertebrates 
3501.10 Casein 
3501.90 Caseinates and other casein derivatives; casein glues 
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3502.20 Albumins; milk albumin, including concentrates of two or more whey 
proteins 
1502.00 Fats of bovine animals, sheep or goats; other than those of heading no. 1503 
4102.21 Skins; raw, of sheep or lambs, pickled (but not tanned, parchment-dressed or 
further preserved), without wool on 
7404.00 Copper; waste and scrap 
7602.00 Aluminium; waste and scrap 
0401.30 Dairy produce; milk and cream, not concentrated, not containing added 
sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content exceeding 6% (by weight) 
 
High Change in Tariff at Implementation of FTA: 
 
0307.49 Molluscs; cuttle fish and squid, frozen, dried, salted or in brine (whether in 
shell or not) 
0404.90 Dairy produce; natural milk constituents (excluding whey), whether or not 
containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, n.e.c. in chapter 04 
0504.00 Animal products; guts, bladders and stomachs of animals (other than fish), 
whole and pieces thereof, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, in brine, dried or 
smoked 
0507.90 Animal products; tortoise-shell, whalebone and whalebone hair, horns, 
antlers, hooves, nails, claws and beaks, unworked or simply prepared but not 
cut to shape, waste and powder of these products 
0810.50 Fruit, edible; kiwifruit,  fresh 
1901.10 Food preparations; of flour, meal, starch, malt extract or milk products, for 
infant use, put up for retail sale 
2204.21 Wine; still, in containers holding 2 litres or less 
7208.39 Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, without patterns in relief, flat-rolled, of a 
width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, of a thickness of less than 3mm 
 
 
